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ABSTRACT
The present paper was an exploratory attempt at examining
changing definitional conceptions of courage.

Traditional conceptions

were found to abound in popular definitions and confusion with respect
to both the meaning and origin of courage. Unconscious conformity to
societal norms, symbolic attachment to national roles, a learning theory
analogue and the broad conception of S-R (stimulus-response) behaviour
were examined as possible explanatory frameworks. An analysis of courage and survival clarified the relationship between courage and hope.
An interdependent rather than independent relationship between the two
concepts was postulated.

The S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) model

was employed as a general explanatory framework for contemporary conceptions of courage. The moral courage of traditional models and the selfreliance found in survival situations were combined into a more comprehensive "personal involvement".

Contemporary courage was defined further

within the framework of a new culture and a freely chosen active adherence to its changing values, attitudes and belief systems.

Cognitive

and interactive risk taking hypotheses, attitude change studies and
social and political activism studies provided indirect empirical support for the postulated definitional components of contemporary courage.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional conceptions of courage, although abundant in
definitions, remain steeped in confusion.

Speculation as to the origins

of courage are enshrouded in a vague form of determinism (e.g., social,
moral (Moran, 1945); climatic, ethnic (Slim, 1957); religious (Barrie,
1922)).

A priori

presented.

assumptions as to the nature of courage are often

Upon close examination, one can discern a multitude of con-

tradictions.

For example, Slim (1957) describes physical courage as

both an emotional and a mental state.
In examining traditional conceptions of courage within the
popular contexts of war, sports and religion, one begins to discern a
definite evolutionary trend.

Quite probably stemming from Stoic tradi-

tion (Tillich, 1952), early writers (e.g., Moran, 1945) stress the cognitive aspect of courage. While the presence of fear or the affective
aspect of "feeling" (Clausewitz, 1968) was recognized, it was controlled
by reason, understanding and will power. The ideal was the absence of
fear. Writers in the religious tradition (Barrie, 1922; Bradley, 1934;
Moore, 1951) provide some link with the affective when stressing the
importance of the

self

in maintaining faith and passive endurance.

Sportsmen emphasize physical courage and an active endurance of physical
stress.
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Pioneer contributions of psychologists appear to have accomplished nothing more than to reinforce the already predominant trend to
value moral as opposed to physical courage. The positive moral or
spiritual courage to live is preferred over the negative physical courage to die (Meerloo, 1944;. Birnbaum, 1948).

Birnbaum's (1948) concep-

tion of courage as "totaleinstellung" or as a total concept, and as an
attitude which demands action in properly coping with life's problems,
allows for a skeletal conceptualization of traditional courage.
The determinism inherent in traditional conceptions of courage
allows for an explanation within the general framework of a StimulusResponse (S-R) model. The notion of "compulsive masculinity" (Parsons,
1947) and social-psychoanalytic conceptions of internalization, and
hence, unconscious conformity to societal norms (Atkin, 1971) also appear
to be appropriate explanatory frameworks. The emphasis on war as the
rite

de passage

to manhood is explained as a symbolic attachment (Katz,

1967) to traditional conceptions of courage.
Courage, when discussed within the context of basic survival
situations (e.g., concentration camps (Frank, 1952; Pawlowicz, 1962);
isolation experiences (Lilly, 1956; Noyce, 1962); disaster situations
(Quarantelli & Dynes, 1973)) is viewed primarily as an affective construct.

Self-reliance often emerges as a basic and necessary antecedant

condition. The mediating variable and private nature of hope, with its
future orientation and roots in a need for affiliation (N-Aff.) allows
for a more complex and interdependent relationship.
Active and successful coping with stress and the maintenance
of a courageous attitude towards suffering are based on a cognitive and
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voluntary decision-making process.

The decision to live or to die is

more clearly defined as man's ultimate choice (Frankl, 1963). Thus,
self-determination is an integral aspect of courage and survival.
Implicit in the decision to cope with stress in a courageous
manner is the concept of a goal. This goal is defined not merely in
the concrete sense of saving a physical life, but in the broader, existential and abstract sense of ultimate psychological survival.

Emphasis

is placed on the maintenance of personal autonomy, integrity, independence, dignity, self-respect and meaning in life (Frankl, 1963; Bettleheim, 1960).

The decision to give up hope and hence, courage, seems to

preclude the possibility of such abstract goal-seeking behaviour.

The

resultant behavioural response of successfully coping with stress might
be interpreted as a form of risk-taking behaviour.

One chooses to risk

physical death in an effort to maintain self-respect and strive towards
ultimate psychological survival.
The need for a changed conception of courage has been indicated by several writers (Mack, 1969; Markowltz, 1971; Kincald & Kincald,
1971).

The moral courage of traditional conceptions and the importance

of the self stressed in survival situations, are collapsed, in contemporary conceptions of courage, into a more comprehensive personal involvement.

Implicit in more recent conceptions of courage is a sense

of self-determinism and freedom of choice.

The basic Stimulus-Organism-

Response (S-O-R) model serves as a general framework for contemporary
definitions of courage.
Contemporary courage, as examined in this paper, may be defined as the voluntary acceptance of the risk inherent in a commitment
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towards and active adherence to the attitudes, values, ideals and
belief systems of the new culture. Cultural change, and the proposed
emergence of a new culture, in direct opposition to the old, (Keniston,
1965; Slater, 1971) is viewed as being the precipitating factor for a
changed conception of courage.
The uncertainty of achieving new culture goals and the possible negative reprisals from old culture adherents, suggests that a
decision to actively adhere to such a system may constitute considerable
risk.

The voluntary nature of such a choice suggests that cognitive

hypotheses which stress information exchange and behavioural decision
theory (Vinokur, 1971) may be most appropriate as explanatory frameworks.
The possibility that contemporary courage may be characteristic of those
with a veridical self-perception as "risky" (Clark & Crockett, 1971) as
well as indicating a general disposition towards risk (Jackson, Hourany
& Vidmar, 1972) is presented.
Qualitative distinctions within contemporary courage may be
isolated by examining the precise nature of one's attitude and commitment towards new culture belief systems. The use of concepts such as
"bolstering" (Mann & Taylor, 1970; Mann, 1971) in combination with the
isolation of choice difficulty (i.e., levels of commitment to action for
change within the new culture) may indicate the presence or absence of
dissonance. A closer examination of actions consistent with attitudes
suggests that only a minority are actually actively involved in actions
designated to produce positive change (e.g., Miller, 1970; Morse & Peele,
1971).

The abstract nature of the expressed goals (i.e., change, peace,

co-operation) and the loosely organized pursuit of these goals, in
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combination with the low probability of immediate concrete success suggests that contemporary courage may call for an External as opposed to
an Internal control orientation (Granberg & May, 1972).
Contemporary courage, as presented in this paper, is postulated as being a general definitional concept. Theoretically, it should
be applicable to committed activists of whatever age and nationality.
The basic feature is the freely chosen and cognitively based decision
to actively commit oneself to working for change in a manner consistent
with new culture belief systems. The following effort is exploratory
in nature. The basic constituents of contemporary courage have been
examined theoretically and presented in a preliminary model. Future
research should concentrate on further operationalizing the various
aspects of contemporary courage, as presented, and subjecting them to
empirical test within the possible frameworks suggested.

FIGURE I

Schematic representation of Trad itiona
A Noticeable Trend in the
Development of Courage as
a Total Concept
I Emphasis on the
Cognitive Aspect

I I Emphasis on the
Cognitive Aspect,
i.e., courage as a
mental state
plus: Affective Aspect,
i.e., moral courage
and the importance of the
"self"
III Emphasis on
Behavioral Aspect,
i.e., physical courage
plus: acknowledging moral
courage as higher
qualitatively
IV Emphasis on Behavioral
(Moral/spiritual) Aspect,
i.e., value placed on
courage to live,
positive courage
V Emphasis on courage as a
Total Concept,
i.e., courage as attitude
which demands action
Cognitive, Affective
plus Behavioral

Courage as "Totaleinst ellung
COGNITIVE

AFFECTIVE

self-control
reason
will power
mental state
mind (Neuer)
understanding

the "self"
fear
feeling
faith
self-confidence
self-discipline

A
TYPES OF COURAGE

il Conceptions of Courage

BEHAVIORAL
properly coping
with difficulties
in life and/or
physical stress

MORAL COURAGE
I
strong character
passive faith, i.e.,
resisting temptation
perseverance

e.g., social courage;
positive courage or
personal revolt;
"mut" or positive
courage
Courage
as

Courage
to
Live

(higher qualitatively)

Courage
to
Die

(lower qualitatively)

Attitude

(higher qualitatively)

e.g., "fall-mut" - i.e. no
fear, hazardous or
negative courage;
collective ecstacy or
negative courage

PHYSICAL COURAGE
strong body
active physical endurance

Which
Demands

Natural
Courage
(no fear)

(higher qualitatively)

Courage
of
Control

(lower qualitatively)

Action

(lower qualitatively)
Motivation

e.g., money
fame
altruistic intentions
conformity to social norms
ethical/moral, i.e., to be of value

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Courage and War
Traditional conceptions of courage are frequently closely
associated with war and demonstrations of heroism therein (Moran, 1945;
Slim, 1957; Crane, 1960; Clausewitz, 1968).

Primary emphasis is placed

on the response of bravery and the demonstration of physical courage in
battle.

Moral courage is mentioned only in passing as being a higher

and ideal form of courage by all the above writers. When considering
the origins of courage one finds a definite flavour of psychic determinism and a sense of social and moral elitism

present (Moran, 1945).

The

data show a complete lack of empiricism and remain totally at the level
of speculation.

An abundance of contradictory comments, a definite

ethnocentrism, and some elements of sexism (Slim, 1957) are also noted.
Present-day symbolic adherence to such traditional conceptions of courage are still in evidence (Golden, 1971).
Moran (1945) defined courage within the framework of danger
and war. He stated:

"It is a platitude of war that the worth of no man,

however able, is proven until it has been submitted to ordeal by battle,
until his response to the havoc of war is known" (p. 53). Implicit in
the above statement is Moran's conception of the courageous man as one
of worth, and more specifically, as a man of good moral sense, and good
character. Moran explicitly states that "courage...is the expression on
the battlefield of character" (p. 147).
7
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The traditional ideal for Moran was the fearless soldier. On
an a priori

basis Moran outlined four orders of men:

1) those who felt

no fear, 2) those who felt fear but did not show it, 3) those who felt
fear, showed it, but still managed to do their job, and 4) those who
felt fear, showed it and ran.

Concommitant with the above four orders

of men were four degrees of courage.

Thus, Moran established a qualita-

tive distinction among men of courage in war.

The ideal was the man who

felt no fear. This was the real man of courage. Although men could move
between the four stages, Moran spoke of the desire of men in war to remain on the "upper rungs of this ladder" (p. 22).
Moran differentiated between "natural courage" and the "courage
of control". This distinction seemed to be based on his ideal of the
courageous soldier who felt no fear. Moran contended that natural courage, the courage of insensibility, was almost extinct among officers in
the army. He ascribed to natural courage the characteristics of lack of
imagination, a vacant mind and fearlessness. He states: "the armies of
long ago were recruited from men who did not feel fear.
seems to have had its roots in a vacant mind.

Their courage

Their imagination played

no tricks. They drew no pictures of danger for their own undoing" (p. 23).
Moran's talk of imagination seems to refer to some type of
anxiety-reaction, of soldiers conjuring up in their minds fears not based
in reality. His own expression for this anxiety was that they experienced "alternatives".

Instead of dealing rationally with the task at

hand, some men pondered over the dangers which might occur should they
perform the task.

In view of the many and varied religious beliefs of

primitive peoples one might seriously question the natural courage, fearlessness and lack of imagination of "armies of long ago." The extensive
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system of gods and spirits and adherence of primitive peoples to animistic and pantheistic religious belief systems does not seem to support
Moran's contention that "their imagination played no tricks" (p. 23).
Moran is also extremely vague with respect to his meaning of "armies of
long ago". The armies to which he refers remain a mystery.
The courage of control seems to be a courage belonging to the
rational man who considers "alternatives".

It is depicted as a forced

and unnatural courage and hence secondary in quality to the natural
courage of old.

To the former Moran ascribed an imagination which was

controlled by character and reason.

The thinking and self-controlled

man would not allow his imagination to run riot. Rather, he put his
imagination to his advantage by structuring the situation.
dangers were considered.

All possible

The soldier with the courage of control then

faced these dangers with his fear in control.
For Moran, the proper attitude in battle, the courageous attitude, was a fearless one. His types (natural courage and courage of
control) may however simply reflect fanciful projections into the past.
They may be based on his obvious dissatisfaction with the quality of
fighting exhibited by the conscripted soldier. He idealized the soldier
who felt no fear. Moran is unable to substantiate this ideal via eyewitness accounts. He therefore concedes to the fact that men may feel
fear and still be courageous. He resorts to an emphasis on reason and
self-control as a basis for this courage of control. His confused speculations and unsound assumptions are summarized and left open to argument
when he states: "My very types are suspect...the existence of natural
courage (fearlessness) as opposed to the courage of control, in any age

10
may be challenged... it is open to argument whether there is or ever has
been anyone who does not feel fear" (p. 23).
In categorizing his four orders of men Moran placed at the
bottom of the list those who felt fear, showed it and ran. One might
assume from this that Moran would also base his discussion of cowardice
primarily on its relationship to fear. Moran, however, makes the statement that cowardice is not equal to fear. He defines cowardice in an
almost totally behaviouristic context. He states:

"The Army Act lays

down that a man is guilty of cowardice when he displays 'an unsoldierlike regard for his personal safety in the presence of the enemy' by
shamefully deserting his post or laying down his arms" (p. 24). Cowardice was viewed as something a man did.

It was very narrowly defined by

Moran as simply running away in the face of the enemy during battle. A
further assumption was that cowardice, as operationally defined above,
is a disgrace and a shameful form of behaviour.
Moran stated, the strength of the common, conscripted soldier,
the "yokel" was based not primarily on real courage but rather, on his
inability to perceive the situation as being really dangerous. He was
more likely to be performing recklessly than courageously.

Moran states:

"He is so staunch in battle because he never stopped to reason, to measure the odds, or to reflect on his own chances of survival" (p. 71).
The courageous man is described by Moran as a man of good
character and good moral sense. The coward is typically depicted as a
common person, a "yokel", a weak man of poor character. A stance of
social elitism

might dictate that fear could not possibly describe both

the courageous and the cowardly individual.

It is perhaps this form of
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reasoning which prompted Moran to make his distinction between cowardice and fear. His sense of social elitism

may not have allowed him to

ascribe similar emotions and similar emotional responses to two different classes of men.

Thus, it could not be fear which makes cowards of

men, for there are men who feel fear and still perform bravely and unselfishly in battle. Only the action of running away labelled a man a
coward.

Moran attempted to define and thus explain cowardice in the

following manner:
By cowardice I do not mean fear. Fear is the response of the
instinct of self-preservation to danger. It is only morbid,
as Aristotle taught, when it is out of proportion to the
degree of the danger. In invincible fear- 'fear stronger than
I am' - the soldier has to struggle with a flood of emotion;
he is made that way...cowardice, that is the label we reserve
for something that a man does. What passes through his mind
is his own affair, (p. 24)
Moran tried to define both courage and cowardice in primarily
a cognitive framework.

The definitive aspects of courage appear to be

reason, will power and self-control. The unfortunate presence of fear
is overcome in an honourable manner by the courageous man largely through
use of his reasoning abilities.
The emphasis on reason and cognition as determinants of courage may explain Moran's contention that intelligence tests be employed
in order to single out potential cowards by eliminating those whose minds
are not developed enough. He states: "If these tests do not help to
pick aces, they do help us to get rid of men who will not make soldiers"
(p. 148). If such means are not employed to detect what Moran terms
"latent weakness" in the young soldier (p. 147) then the final test of
war must be employed.
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Underlying Moran's treatment of courage is a strong sense of
determinism.

Implicit in this deterministic approach is a definite

sense of social and moral Slitism.

Moran was adament in his belief that

courage is not a common entity, nor is it unlimited in quantity.

Once a

man's courage was used up, it was not restorable. Moran likened a man's
courage to a bank account and stated:

"A man's courage is his capital

and he is always spending" (p. 17). There was a limit to the number of
good men that any nation could furnish.

In times of peace as well as in

war, all fine things are the work of only a few men.
Moran fails to specify the exact origins of this limited quantity of courage which is extant in only a few good men.

It is not born

as a result of the war process, for war serves only to exaggerate or
bring forth the qualities, courageous or cowardly, which exist in men in
time of peace. War, Moran claimed, could not change a man. A man is
either weak or he is strong and situations only elicit these inherent
qualities. Physical hardships of war which may lead to nervous fatigue
and boredom, will wear down only the man who is initially inclined to be
cowardly and weak.

Men who broke under the stress of battle were des-

cribed by Moran as lacking in moral sense "without which no soldier can
endure the stress and terror of the modern battle field" (p. 148).
Moran contends that fortitude in times of war has its roots in
morality.

Selection is the search for character and "war itself is but

one more test, the supreme and final test...of character" (p. 154). A
man of character in peace becomes a man of courage in war. He thought
of courage as a moral quality, as self-discipline, which could readily
be evidenced in times of peace. Although Moran mentions certain standards
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of peace to which people pay scant attention, standards which could
point out the courageous men, he never explicitly stated what these ambiguous standards are.
Moran's slight elaboration of his meaning of "character" leads
us no further than the moralistic basis already ascribed to courage. He
states that character is the habit of choosing right over wrong, the
development of a strong conscience.

This moral quality of choosing

right over wrong grows to maturity in times of peace and is suddenly
developed and brought out by war. War does not change our basic nature,
it merely exposes it.

"Man's fate in battle is worked out before war

begins...his actions in war are dictated not by courage, nor by fear,
but by conscience, of which war is the final test...if you know a man in
peace, you know him in war" (Moran, p. 154).
Thus, courage, according to Moran, has its roots in some vague
and undefined form of psychic determinism.

This determinism is itself

embedded in some form of Christian morality.

To complicate further the

issue of both definition and origin, Moran adds the prejudicial element
of social elitism.

He states that "good soldiers are not bred from bad

stock" (p. 152). It is also not pure chance that in war some men are
branded cowards and others courageous.

Some men, Moran claims, were

cowards before they ever became soldiers. For this reason they fail to
stand up to the rigours of battle. A battle serves only to "carry out
the weeding process a little further.

It raises the standards of the

test a little more and thus strengthens the bond between the 'elect'"
(p. 125).

14
Courage then, appears to be a socially determined characteristic.

It has its roots in morality and finds its recognized expression

primarily through the channels of battle in times of war.

If a man has

been morally inadequate in the past, he will continue to prove himself
so in the future.

If he is inherently of weak character and conscience,

then he will prove cowardly in war.

Courage is the moral quality of the

man of character, the virtuous man.
Courage is a moral quality; it is not a chance gift of nature
like an aptitude for games. It is a cold choice between two
alternatives, the fixed resolve not to quit; an act of
renunciation which must be made not once but many times by
the power of the will. Courage is will power. (Moran, p. 71)
Moran leaves one with three basic definitions of courage. It
is a social quality, a moral quality and a cognitive quality.

These are

all somehow aspects of a man's character and seen in an absolute sense
as being either present or absent. On this basis Moran judges men as
exhibiting either courage or cowardliness in battle. He fails, however,
to perceive the basic contradiction in his thinking. Ascribing qualities such as will power, self-control, moral knowledge of right and
wrong and a social basis to courage implies that courage may be developed or learned.
The deterministic basis of courage, in addition to its religious overtones and an adherence to the ideal of the fearless soldier are
also very evident in Slim (1957).

Courage is defined by Slim as "the

basic virtue in man or beast" (p. 3). Thus, he not only places courage
in an ethical context but relates it to the animal realm as well.

Slim

never does explain this inclusion of animals in his discussion of courage. Anyone who possesses courage, he says, must automatically be good,
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for "you can't be good without being brave" (p. 5 ) . Furthermore, courage is not only the basis of all virtue, it is its expression."

Courage

is the virtue. Without it there are no other virtues. Faith, hope, and
charity and other virtues do not become virtues until it takes courage
to exercise them" (Slim, p. 5 ) .
If courage is the basic virtue as Slim claims, then, following
from his comment that you cannot be good without being brave, it might
be possible to determine whether or not someone is courageous. One might
procure measures of external religiosity and thus isolate the Churchgoers
or for example, the philanthropists.

Using Slim's definition as a cri-

terion measure of courage, one might be able to deduce that these "virtuous" people would also necessarily be "courageous". By virtue of exclusion, however, the non-churchgoers and the poor who have no external
means of demonstrating their charity, or their "goodness", would have to
be classified as "non-courageous".

The solution to defining courage and

hence determining who the brave really are is not as simple as Slim's
initial definition would make it appear.
Slim becomes entangled in one of his own contradictions. He
also states that "you may be bad and brave" (p. 5 ) . This leaves us virtually stranded as far as having a clear-cut ethical measure of courage
available. We can neither define "virtue", "good", or "bad" and hope to
arrive at a viable determinant of courage.

Slim has thoroughly confused

the issue. According to his two-sided, ethically based definition, all
people have at least the sufficient if not the necessary condition for
being brave. We could only assume that some people, the good people, may
be more courageous than the bad people. Also, Slim's confusion of good,
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bad and brave seems to be inherently illogical.

If courage is a virtue

and the basis of all virtues, then it should follow that if bad people
can be courageous, then they should also be called virtuous people, or
perhaps be classified as "good" people. In short, Slim's discussion of
courage as the basic virtue leaves much to be desired in terms of potential for empiricism.

His definition of courage is circular and sounds

much like mere traditional rhetoric.
Slim also defines courage as "a mental state" (p. 5). The
sources of strength for this mental state called courage are both spiritual and intellectual. Slim states:
The way in which these spiritual and intellectual elements
are blended, I think, produces roughly two types of courage.
The first, an emotional state, which urges a man to risk
injury or death- physical courage. The second, a more reasoning attitude which enables him cooly to stake career,
happiness, his whole future on his judgment of what he thinks
either right or worthwhile- moral courage, (p. 5)
On the basis of the above definition, physical courage is obviously the
lesser qualitatively, and a distinction is established.

Man is a reason-

ing creature and it seems not at all unlikely that on this basis alone
Slim would attach greater salience to moral courage. He states that
"moral courage is a higher and a rarer virtue than physical courage"
(p. 6). He appears to be employing the terms "spiritual" and "intellectual" in the sense of emotional and rational respectively.
One obvious contradiction in Slim's discussion of courage as a
mental state is his description of moral courage, as noted in the brief
quote above, as "a rarer virtue".

Thus, courage appears to be a mental

state, with its psychological properties of emotion and cognition creating a qualitative distinction between moral and physical courage.

It is
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also a virtue, thus attributing to courage a religious, ethical sense,
one which forms the basis for a general good approach towards life.
Slim not only fails to explain why he calls courage both a virtue and a
mental state, but he also fails to provide adequate definitions of the
terms he so loosely employs. His assumptions and definitions, as do
those of Moran (1945) lack an empirical basis.
A more blatant and damaging contradiction occurs in Slim's
discussion of physical courage. He claims that the buttress of physical
courage is to have good control of your imagination, not to let your
mind frighten you, not to allow fears of the unknown or undue anxiety
take hold of you in a stressful situation.

Physical courage can be

taught. You can "train the man not to draw too heavily on his stock of
courage.

Teach him what to expect, not to be frightened by bogeys-by

the unknown" (p. 9 ) . The essence of physical courage seems to be expectation and the path to courage education with respect to what one might
expect in any given situation. Physical courage could be summed up in
the words: expectation, confrontation, skill.
Slim's definition of physical courage contains qualities very
similar to Moran (1945) in that he attributes reasoning or cognitive components to courage.

Slim, however, goes one step beyond Moran in that

he acknowledges that courage, at least physical courage, can be taught.
The contradiction lies in Slim's prior definition of physical and moral
courage.

In that definition he attributed reasoning qualities to moral

and not to physical courage.
emotional basis.

The latter, Slim stated, had primarily an
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Again similar to Moran (1945), Slim adheres to a vague and
relatively undefined form of determinism.

Slim states that all men are

born with a certain amount of courage, "a certain capital".

There are

differences in initial amounts for different people. He states:
All men have some degree of physical courage, it is surprising how much. Courage you know is having money in the bank.
We start with a certain capital of courage, some large, some
small, and we proceed to draw on our balance, for, don't
forget, courage is an expendible quality. We can use it up.
If there are heavy, and, what is more serious, if there are
continuous calls on our courage we begin to overdraw. If we
go on overdrawing, we go bankrupt - we break down. (Slim, p. 6)
Like Moran (1945), Slim does not explain from where this initial amount
of courage eminates; nor does he state why some are initially more gifted with courage than others.
Slim presents us with the confused definition of courage as a
virtue, a quality, a mental state, which we all possess in varying
amounts, and which is expendible. Using up all of our endowed courage
results in an inability to function, a breakdown.

The non-courageous

are those who have expended their supply.
Slim does speculate as to the origin of courage in general,
especially the "particularly practical and effective kind of courage"
displayed by the British.

Thus, a definite ethnocentrism colours Slim's

conception of courage. He calls this courage of the British a "natural
courage" and links it to their geographical origins. Somehow, having
your ancestry stem from the Northern part of Europe and having roots in
the peoples of the Mediterranean, accounts for this natural courage.
Slim does not define this term.

One might speculate that its meaning is

close to that posited by Moran (1945) - who defined natural courage as
the fearless courage of ancient armies.
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Where a people had lived for the past five or six hundred
years, Slim stated, was a determining factor of the stated racial difference in courage. He combines geographical background with social and
economic prevailing conditions and thus determines the degree of courage
possessed by a particular race. With the exception of brief references
to the courage of the Japanese, Germans and the British during the war,
Slim does not specify races and their degree of courage. He does state:
If it has been in a land where it did not take much effort to
get enough food, clothing and shelter for an easy life, they
will not be conspicuously brave.
If they have lived where life is so hard that it is a terrible
struggle against nature to keep any standard of living at all,
then they will be brave in a few things - dangers to which they
are inured - but not at all brave in others.
It is the lands where nature is neither too easy nor too cruel,
where a man must work hard to live but where his efforts and
his enterprise can bring him great rewards, that breeds courage
and is where it becomes a natural tradition, (pp. 10-11)
In the second paragraph, one detects the influence of Puritan ethics and
the belief that life is a test. Within the third paragraph seems to lie
the New World capitalistic tradition of competition.
In addition to his poorly defined racial and/or social-economic
determinism, Slim completes his definition by attributing a definite
religious basis to courage.

Instead of merely defining courage as a

virtue, he now claims that "we have based our natural courage on faith,
a belief that we worked or fought for the things that mattered - a decent
life" (p. 11). This addition of "faith" as a determining characteristic
of courage only serves to confound further the issue.

It is as dubious

and meaningless as Moran's (1945) reference to character and conscience
as the basis of courage.
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Perhaps to justify his ethnocentric stance, Slim joins religious terminology with time and refers to courage as a "long-term virtue"
(p. 10). He claims that "anyone can be brave for a little while...we
the British, have our own special kind of courage, the courage that goes
on, and endurance is the very essence of courage" (p. 10). Slim tries
to say that the British soldier is not braver than other soldiers, he is
only braver for a longer period of time and this is what counts.
With the introduction of "endurance" as being the very basis
of courage and Slim's further description of this enduring courage as
staying "where he is until he has won" (p. 49) one might derive a possible operational definition of courage.

Courage could be defined as

being equivalent to Endurance (E), which is a function of the time remaining at a specified task (f)t(x), divided by Time which is specified
as a fixed value t(y) and equal to 1.
Equation: C - E(f) | ^ - = 1
One could speculate that endurance will increase with the proportional
increase of time £ remains at a specified task.

The closer the resultant

equation is to 1, the higher the degree of courage which might be attributed to S_.
To complicate the issue further, Slim attributes a definite
gender to courage by referring to it as a "male attitude" (p. 5 ) . This
obvious sexism may be closely tied to the traditional conception of courage and bravery on the battlefield.

Slim again introduces a basic con-

tradiction. He states: "Whether women are braver than men I don't know,
but I have always found them, when really tested, at least equally brave"
(p. 10). He makes vague reference to the bravery of the women in India,
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the refugees, who were "patient, uncomplaining, devoted, thinking only
of their families, so very brave" (p. 10). This might simply be a token
bravery, stemming perhaps from the traditional role conception of the
devoted and uncomplaining mother. As for Slim's purported "tests" of
courage, these are left unspecified.

Employing sex as a variable in

further research might clarify the issue.
Clausewitz (1968) also linked courage with danger in war. His
definitions of courage concentrate on distinguishing moral and physical
courage. He remains more the philosopher-soldier and does not confound
his definitions with deterministic, ethnocentric and ethical factors.
Clausewitz distinguishes between physical and moral courage and
further differentiates these two types of courage as follows:
Courage is of two kinds: first, physical courage, or courage
in the presence of danger to the person; and next, moral
courage, or courage before responsibility, whether it be before the judgement-seat of external authority, or of the inner
power, the conscience. (p. 139)
Courage before danger to the person, again, is of two kinds.
First, it may be indifference to danger, whether proceeding
from the organism or the individual's contempt of death, or
habit: in any of these cases it is to be regarded as a permanent condition. Secondly, courage may proceed from positive
motives, such as personal pride, patriotism, enthusiasm of
any kind. In this case courage is not so much a normal condition as an impulse. (pp. 139-140)
The two kinds of courage combined, Clausewitz states, make up the "most
perfect kind of courage" (p. 140).
His treatment of courage and its definition, is however, by no
means clear. He employs confusing terminology, in the tradition of
writers such as Slim (1957) and Moran (1945), and proceeds to call courf

age a "moral quality" (p. 116), an

"impulse" (p. 140) and "a nobler
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instinct" (p. 187). His reference to courage as "a power in itself"
(p. 187) does nothing to clarify the situation.
In his treatment of the possible origins of courage, Clausewitz
seems to be combining both cognitive and affective elements. He refers
to the former as some form of "understanding" (p. 142) and to the latter
as a "feeling" (p. 187). Unlike Moran (1945) and Slim (1957), he deemphasizes the role of cognition and places emphasis on the affective
nature of courage. "The mind must, therefore, first awaken the feeling
of courage and then be guided and supported by it, because in momentary
emergencies the man is swayed more by his feelings than his thoughts"
(p. 142). He states that courage is definitely not "an act of the understanding, but likewise a feeling, like fear" (p. 187). Courage is not
simply a prescribed response to danger but an inner power which is concerned also with man's moral preservation.
Thus, Clausewitz defines courage as having its base within the
individual.

A combination of affective and cognitive elements interact

and result in a behaviour termed courage.

This behaviour is, however,

still definitely tied to the battlefield and situations of combat danger
therein. Although deterministic statements as to who the courageous will
be are absent, the Stimulus is still war, and the Response bravery or
courage.
Crane's novel The Red Badge of Courage (in Stallman, 1960)
clearly illustrates the traditional conception of courage as perceived by
Slim (1957) and Moran (1945).

The incorporation of courage as defined by

them, into novel form, suggests that these conceptions of courage may
have been cultural values rather than simply isolated definitions of a
specific behaviour.
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Henry Fleming's (The Red Badge of Courage) desire to go to
war and his wish for "a wound, a (little) red badge of courage" (p. 59)
illustrates the need which existed to prove yourself a man in battle
and to be able to demonstrate this to others. Of himself, Henry states:
He finally concluded that the only way to prove himself was
to go into the blaze, and then figuratively, to watch his
legs to discover their merits and faults. He could not sit
still and with a mental slate and pencil derive an answer.
To gain it he must have the blaze, blood and danger...so he
fretted for an opportunity, (p. 21)
Courage appears to be an observable action, a visible demonstration of your manhood.

This suggests that in order to maintain one's

self-esteem a man has to prove himself in a dangerous situation. War is
a socially approved mode of achieving this goal.
type of rite

de passage.

Going to war may be a

Predominant is a mysterious attraction to the

field of battle and the accompanying myth of an unveiling or a sudden
transformation.

Henry Fleming "had been taught that a man became an-

other thing in battle. He saw his salvation in such a change...to go
into battle and discover that he had been a fool in his doubts and was
in truth a man of traditional courage" (The Red Badge of Courage, in
Stallman, p. 59).
The traditional ideal of the fearless soldier posed some problems for Henry.

He could not bring himself to admit openly and discuss

his own fear with others, nor was his fear acceptable to himself. The
deterministic and elitist

belief that "the boys come of good stock, and

most of 'em '11 fight like sin after they oncet git shootin'..." (p. 120)
may have, on a superficial level, helped to alleviate his distress.
Psychologically, this conflict between the ideal and the real appears to
be a case of cognitive dissonance.
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Henry's personal experience of fear in battle and the ideal
of the fearless, heroic soldier were not consistent.

In order to main-

tain the ideal of courage in war he had to project blame onto the Government who had started the war and forced him to enlist. He viewed the
government as plotting to put an end to his life by making him fight its
battles.

He had been coerced into a dangerous situation, for the explic-

it purpose of killing him!

Thus, should he run away it would not be due

to his own cowardice, lack of courage or submission to fear. "It
occurred to him that he had never wished to come to the war. He had not
enlisted of his free-will. He had been dragged by the merciless government. And now they were taking him out to be slaughtered"(p. 30). In
reality, Henry had enlisted voluntarily.
In view of Henry Fleming's fear of death and injury and his
subsequent flight from battle it might be appropriate to label him a coward according to Moran's definition. However, his fear of ridicule from
others, his fear of the label "coward" and his desire to possess a wound,
a visible sign of courage, led him back to the battle. Thus, in the
same individual, we perceive the coward (Moran's definition) and the
courageous lad who returned to successfully complete his duty (Slim's
definition).

This is definitely inconsistent with the notion of a pre-

determined courage. Moran's explanation of a possible "commotional
shock" experience is not viable since Henry had made a definite decision
to run and then to return. A more comprehensive definition of courage,
one which incorporates the real as well as the ideal in a model with a
more substantial basis seems necessary.
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Traditional conceptions of courage and war appear to have
their basis primarily in a priori

assumptions and speculations. Their

definitions lack an empirical basis and have failed to take into account
the actual experience of the person in the dangerous or stressful situation.

Courage is therefore viewed as being an "absolute" rather than a

"relative" characteristic.
Religious Courage
Moral courage and a passive and enduring attitude towards
life's struggles and temptations are stressed by writers in the religious tradition (Barrie, 1922; Bradley, 1934; Moore, 1951).

The crucial

test is not war and the activity of battle, but rather, life in general
and a passive optimistic acceptance of its problems (Bradley, 1934).
Courage is not determined by good character and conscience but is now
described as being the basis for building a strong character (Moore,
1951).

Reference to courage as a God-given virtue (Barrie, 1922) suggests

a form of religious determinism.

Some confusion arises from the fact that

the self is also stressed as an important determinant of courage.
Barrie (1922) expresses views similar to Slim (1957) when he
comments that courage is a virtue. He defines it somewhat metaphorically
as "the lovely virtue...the rib of Himself that God sent down to his
children" (p. 7). Like Slim, he also includes an apparently unrecognized
and unresolved contradiction.

Barrie compares courage to a staff which

aids us in our journey through life.
one must build for himself.

Courage is a strength which every-

It is unclear as to which takes precedence,

the self-derived strength or the other-derived virtue.

One might specu-

late that this self-derived courage is the basis of a quantitative
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difference in degree of courage which may exist in men. That is, man
may, through his own efforts, work towards increasing the basic amount
of God-given courage which he initially possesses.
Barrie also supports the traditional ideal of heroism in war
and the value of fighting for one's country.
of demonstrating one's manhood by proving

He emphasized the necessity

oneself courageous in battle.

Youth, he stressed, should be courageous and demand some partnership in
decisions such as war which pertain to them.

He states:

"The end will

have come to courage and to us when we are afraid in dire misfortune to
refer the final appeal to the arbitrament of arms" (pp. 10-11).
Bradley (1934) emphasized the importance of courage as a
strength arising from the self.

Inner control, self-discipline, confid-

ence and faith are the bases for building the inner strength which he
calls courage. A courageous attitude towards hardships in life stems
primarily from within and must always be assumed.
on life which contains struggles and privations.

A high value is placed
For Bradley, the cru-

cial and necessary test of courage is the difficult life. Only through
facing and overcoming problems can we build courage and a strong character.
The origin of courage and its precise definition, other than
being defined as some sort of inner strength which builds character, is
left in a state of confusion.

Courage is at once born out of hardship

and struggle and stems primarily from within. A third source is vaguely
defined as "poise", from which "all strength is born" (p. 184). This
poise is viewed as an attitude of faith in oneself and is described as
sowing the seeds for courage.

Courage itself is then further defined as

"a reservoir which can be utilized for power" (p. 183).
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Bradley defines moral courage as following one's convictions,
breaking with tradition, and dedicating

oneself to humanitarian causes

even though they may be unpopular. He attributes to moral courage a
higher qualitative status than physical courage. Anyone, Bradley claims,
can leap into the water to save a drowning friend or walk into the face
of a cannon.

Fewer people, however, possess real moral bravery, as he

defines it. Unfortunately Bradley fails to define moral courage in a
more specific sense. Anyone who puts up with all of life's vicissitudes
without complaining to any degree would be categorized by Bradley as being highly courageous. Also, he gives no reason for valuing passive endurance of life's struggles over the physical activity of saving a life.
Moore (1951) distinguishes between the physical courage demonstrated in war and the moral courage which is employed to resist temptation. Physical courage is an occasional occurrence, while moral courage
is constantly required of us. Any Christian who resists and believes in
the existence of constant temptation throughout life will, according to
Moore's conception of courage, possess a high degree of moral courage.
Moore himself claimed that standing for the right when it is unpopular,
being faithful to duty when your heart is broken, and remaining a Christian in a pagan world all require courage.
Moore further defines courage as "patience and long-suffering
with joyfulness" (p. 35). The test of courage, a physical strength, is
not activity but "the practice of passive virtues" (p. 35). Patience is
the opposite of cowardice or despondency.

Thus we are presented with a

patient, long-suffering courage, a hopeful courage, a courage to faith,
to turn the other cheek since "longsuffering contrasts with wrath and
revenge" (p. 35).
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Courage, as defined by the above writers, emerges simply as
a strength.

Further distinctions and definitions are largely coloured

by the basic shared value placed on hardship and their Christian religious belief systems. Courage itself appears to lose all definitiveness.
It could very well be ascribed to any Christian or uncomplaining sufferer.
The Physical Courage of Sportsmen
Frequent references to courage are made by sportsmen (Mantle,
1964) and sports commentators (Schoor, 1967; Barber, 1969).

Courage is

viewed as a quality belonging to the sportsman who has demonstrated
"determination", "self-confidence", "guts", and possesses a general
orientation towards the competitive success ethic of North America
(Mantle, 1964).

Some writers question whether courage exists within the

realm of champions (e.g., Schoor, 1967).

Interviews with sportsmen

(e.g., Playboy, 1972) seem to indicate the absence of courage per se as
a major component of the self-concept of sportsmen.

Their behaviour

might be better described as "zest" (Russell, 1930).
Mantle (1964) defines courage in an extremely broad context.
His conceptions of courage are all closely aligned with physical action
and strength, bravery and skill. Mantle's comment that courage is a
"quality, not a thing whose physical dimensions you can describe" (p. 27)
is as meaningless as the many types of courage he describes. He speaks
of "the courage to try", "the courage of your convictions", "the courage
of confidence", "instant courage", "the courage of toughness", "passive
or quiet courage", "the courage to be yourself", "the courage to be honest,
patient, to struggle on, to hope and to change". Mantle's comment that
courage is also an everyday thing adds a definite universality to the
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concept.

Courage is conceived of as simply the man on the street, cop-

ing with day to day living, and doing his job.

"The brave men are the

ones who get the job done everyday" (p. 22).
A distinction made between physical and moral courage (Barber,
1969) is equally as vague and undefined.

Barber comments:

"Everyone

has an obscure respect for courage in others especially if it is moral
courage, the rarest and most difficult sort of bravery...it makes the
very brute understand that this is more than a man" (p. 38). Moral courage is discussed primarily within the context of breaking the colour bar
in sports.

It is viewed as an ideal which somehow signifies that you

are a man among men. Moral courage is placed by Barber primarily within
the realm of interpersonal relations and battling prejudice. Mantle
(1964) described this breaking of the colour bar in sports as a "passive"
courage.

Quiet acceptance of abuse (moral courage) by Blacks, seems to

be a pre-requisite for the demonstration of successful activity (physical
courage), in sports. Persistance also appears to play a major role in
moral courage.
The operational definition derived in this writer's discussion
of Slim (1957) might be useful in determining the sportsmens' degree of
courage (p. 20). Distinguishing between physical and moral courage on
the basis of this equation presents a problem.

Barber's distinction

would lead one to believe that, given the same outcome or proportion of
courage, one would label the white man as "physically courageous" and
the black man as "morally courageous". The assumption would be that both
white and black Ss are new players and equated on other major variables
such as size, experience and so on.
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One might legitimately question the meaningfulness of the
distinction between moral and physical courage as presented by the
sportsmen cited.

Should these two types of courage be differentiated

on the basis of race, or should they be differentiated on the basis of
active physical perseverance at a specific task.
courage as a general coping mechanism.

One might define moral

Exceptional stress situations

such as war and the stress of sports might be defined as physical courage. However, the realization that these very distinctions are merely
a priori

assumptions, thoroughly confounded with ethical and social

values, places serious limitations on any efforts to discern an empirical basis for them.

Both physical and moral courage could be defined

generally as a method of successfully coping with stress.
Although Schoor (1967) makes the claim that "it's courage that
makes the champion" (p. 20) there are others who dispute this fact. In
his own book Schoor presents the contradictory opinion of a ballplayer,
Red Schoendienst.

Red felt that you could do anything, as long as you

had the necessary determination to do it.

Schoor remarks: "courage?

Red wouldn't think it took courage to do the best you could at the game
you loved" (p. 123). Again there exists a seemingly unrecognized and
certainly unresolved contradiction.

Courage may or may not be an element

in achieving championship.
Sportsmen frequently speak of courage within the context of
success and winning a game (Mantle, 1964).

Courage, is however, also a

characteristic attributed to the defeated sportsman.

It is a label

proudly assigned to the man who has lost, yet has persevered and preserved his pride by fighting to the end, by finishing the game. Schoor
states that Barney Ross, a boxer, was still on his feet when the last
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gong sounded. He had lost the championship, but he had not lost his
pride. No one had witnessed a greater demonstration of courage in the
ring.

Thus, the concepts of time and endurance again emerge as crucial

variables. Winning or losing is peripheral.

It is how an individual

wins or loses that counts. Of primary importance is keeping one's pride
intact.
A symposium in Playboy (1972) on sportsmen isolates a variable
which may be central in determining the nature of courage in sportsmen.
Questioning as to "why" these men participated in sports suggests motivations which may be key factors. The self-concept of being courageous is,
however, conspicuously absent in the answers. Stressed was the importance of skill, the desire to be the best and the need to drive oneself
to victory. Monetary rewards as well as simply liking the sport and
finding success satisfying to the ego were also mentioned.
Physical courage might, in view of the above, be operationally
defined in the narrow sense, as a prescribed specific behaviour within
a specified context. Thus, a home run or remaining in the boxing ring
until the final bell could be defined as physical courage.

The ideal of

moral courage, expressed by both sports and religious writers, might be
more appropriately investigated as a "courageous attitude". Interpreting moral courage as an attitude instead of a socially prescribed behaviour may lend itself to a more meaningful and viable investigation of
courage outside the specific behavioural contexts of war, religion and
sports. Within such a framework one could perhaps explain the presence
of either physical and/or moral courage in different individuals. Attributing a label such as "physical courage" to a person's overt behaviour
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and attributing an attitude of courage to the person performing the
behaviour may be two separate processes.

Determinants of the first

might be defined as practice in developing a specific skill, physical
endurance and active perseverance.

Determinants of the attitude might

be more difficult to extract and could lead to personality correlates
of courage.
A major component of physical courage might be what Russell
(1930) described as "zest". Zest connotes an interest in a great variety
of things which life offers. Zest also implies a sense of adventure and
a search for experience.

Russell believed that zest was built on a

sense of security, self-confidence and lack of fear.
claimed, exhibit this self-confidence
mountains or conquering the seas.

Some men, he

and fearlessness by climbing

Russell also attributed zest to what

this writer has termed a "courageous attitude". He mentions that some
possess a general self-confidence towards life which is to be moreso
admired.
The notion of a qualitative distinction between the behaviour
called physical courage and the attitude called moral courage although
frequently mentioned, lacks empirical basis. It appears to stem primarily from the inherent higher value placed on inner processes such as
thought and feeling as opposed to outer behaviour.

Attributing a higher

qualitative value to one (i.e., moral courage) as opposed to the other
(i.e., physical courage) seems to be an arbitrary decision.
Pioneer Contributions of Psychologists
Attempts of writers within the field of psychology (Neuer, 1936;
Birnbaum, 1948; Meerloo, 1944; Adler, 1956) at defining courage have been
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far from satisfactory.

Several types of courage are discussed (Meerloo,

1944) and a feeble effort made to justify the ensuing qualitative distinctions. Adler's definition of "social courage" is vaguely linked to
the psychologically non-neurotic individual. Neuer (1936) goes no further than merely defining courage as a social quality.

The most compre-

hensive effort (Birnbaum, 1948) to discern the actual meaning of courage
remains enshrouded in a quasi-philosophical approach.
Meerloo (1944) established a distinction between the courage
to live and the courage to die. The former is ascribed a higher value
qualitatively.

Similar to all writers previously cited, Meerloo offers

no concrete or empirical basis for this ranking. Again, one can only
assume that this distinction is perhaps quite arbitrary and closely
linked to the value preference of the writer (in this instance, for life
over death).
Meerloo links courage with war and remarks that military decorations are symbolic of courage or bravery. He does not, however, limit
himself to such a narrow conception of courage. Meerloo feels that courage is not of a simple nature.

Calling certain deeds heroic is not suf-

ficient to explain courage. He described the highest form of courage (to
live) as follows:
(the highest form of courage is) that which springs from
self-control. Here the individual dares to place himself
in opposition to the mass, to break away from tradition, to
assert his own personality, and is prepared to suffer for
the sake of his convictions- such courage is creative. It
attempts to overcome the boundaries imposed by man's animal
nature; it is ready to break new ground, it is necessary to
all growth, indeed to life itself...As a free people, we
must choose the affirmative courage of life, not the negative
sacrifice of death. (p. 61)
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His conception of courage as arising from "self-control" provides an
obvious link with writers of the war tradition.

Speaking of the highest

form of courage as one which involves "convictions" is also quite similar to religious writers' conceptions of the most valued form of courage.
Thus, Meerloo's courage to live shares some similarities with religious
conceptions of moral courage. Meerloo, however, further defines this
valued courage by claiming that it is the necessary basis of all life
and growth. As for knowing what this "basis" consists of, why it is
necessary and why we should choose life, these are issues which Meerloo
fails to confront and answer.
Meerloo also distinguished between the courage of primitive
peoples and the courage of the Greeks. He described the attitude of some
unspecified primitive peoples as being iconoclastic or simple revolt. He
viewed such forms of revolt not as courageous but as a crime. Those who
revolted against the early tribal gods and customs were punished by death
or exile. Meerloo confuses the issue by calling this iconoclastic revolt
"negative courage" and thus not to be honoured as being heroic. Outwardly,
Meerloo remarks, it might have the appearance of heroism, but in reality
it is destructive behaviour.

Linking the term "courage", even if negative,

to a form of behaviour which he denies is courageous, certainly does
little to clarify the issue.
The Greeks, Meerloo states, possessed "hybris". This is defined in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College
Edition, (Urdang, 1968), as "hubris, n. excessive pride or self-confidence;
arrogance. Also, Hybris (Gk: insolence) (p. 644). Meerloo viewed this
as being of a positive nature "which in

disrupting established modes of
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life might achieve progress" (p. 59). On what basis he views "excessive pride" or "insolence" for that matter, as being positive, is not
clear. Meerloo may simply be expressing his own biased views.
Meerloo also distinguished between "personal revolt" and
"collective ecstacy".

The latter is characteristic of primitive bravery

and of most army manoevers which are commonly termed heroic.

Soldiers

who perform great heroic deeds, Meerloo states, are in most cases simply
exercising a form of collective bravery.

Soldiers with nothing to live

for no longer value their lives. As a result, they decide to give their
lives for their country. He categorizes these soldiers as being primarily members of the underground.
for their bravery.

They are not interested in any applause

They simply have nothing left to live for.

Meerloo defined "collective bravery" as "an ecstatic surrender
to a suicidal impulse of the self".

In primitive peoples this was ex-

hibited as a type of "mass excitement" wherein the individual lost himself in the crowd.

As a result, he "performs deeds which without this

stimulus he would never have contemplated" (p. 59). Meerloo claims that
personal courage characterizes a democratic environment as opposed to
primitive cultures. On this basis it is to be rated as being of higher
value qualitatively. Historically, Greece was considered a democracy.
Perhaps therein lies Meerloo's notion that "hybris" is of a positive
nature.
Meerloo does not explicitly state whether the courage to live,
positive courage and personal revolt are one and the same form of courage. Also, this writer can only speculate that collective courage,
negative courage and the courage to die refer to one type of courage.
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Meerloo seems to use these sets of terms interchangeably.
have been adequately defined.

None of them

Another criticism lies in his assumption

that most soldiers of the underground are suicidal and have nothing to
live for. He fails to support this contention with sound empirical data.
This reflects negatively on his discussion of courage.
Neuer (1936) also takes recourse to the Greeks in support of
his definition of courage. He defines "mut" or "courage" as the universal social quality of the human psyche. The courageous mind, or "soul"
is defined as "the mind (spirit) that springs from, and lives in, community; that lives with and works for, community".

He states that in the

history of philosophy the word courage meant the same as "mind". Neuer
also claims that the Greek word "Thymos" meant both courage and mind (or
soul, spirit and emotion).

It would have been extremely helpful had

Neuer elaborated on his conception of "social", its relationship to
"community", and hence the supposed origin of courage. As it stands, his
definition is not very useful to a psychologist. At best, it can provide
us only with the smallest hint that perhaps courage has some connection
with social relationships or with the community within which we live.
Adler (in Ansbacher, 1956) in the treatment of neurotics with
his technique of Individual Psychology, attempts to increase courage and
decrease discouragement in the person.

Adler defines courage as a social

courage, one which involves a basic social interest as well as activity.
Activity and courage, however, are not necessarily equated.

Alder states:

"Only the activity of an individual who plays the game, cooperates, and
shares in life can be designated as courage" (p. 166). He frequently
defines courage in terms of the activity involved in expressing one's
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social interest, in striving to overcome feelings of inferiority and
actively confronting the tasks of life. He links self-confidence and
courage, stating that they are the basis of all constructive and creative activity.
Activity, as Adler speaks of it, appears to resemble healthy
attitude towards life. He calls this attitude"courage".

Thus, one

might conceive of courage as a psychologically healthy, self-confident
approach towards life. It does not seem to necessitate any specific
overt behaviour other than a general social interest.
Also within the realm of the therapeutic, Birnbaum (1948) described "Fall-Mut" as "hazardous or bold courage". One might roughly
translate this to mean "psychopathic courage". A person with this type
of negative courage is indifferent towards any risk. According to
Birnbaum, he feels no fear nor any anxiety.
age.

It looks like positive cour-

It is, however, only a reflection of positive courage, just as the

diabolic is only a reflection of the divine.
Both positive and negative courage, Birnbaum claims, have a
common front, i.e., anxiety, or fear. Each individual's mode of solving
this problem, of confronting fear, and dealing with it is different.
The mode of positive courage is of more value.

Birnbaum does not elabor-

ate on these modes of coping with fear and/or anxiety.

From his vague

discussion of a criminal and a judge, the former possessing "Fall-Mut"
and the latter, positive courage, one might assume that adherence to the
law may differentiate these modes of coping with fear. This is however
only a speculation.
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Birnbaum concludes with a circular statement which leaves one
extremely unenlightened as to both the meaning of courage and the treatment of "fall-mut".

Fear, he says, will always be with us. Only cour-

age will have an effect on courage.

One can only conquer the "fall-mut"

by the courage that is the will to ascend and to move upwards. He identifies this unique and seemingly miraculous transformation as a transformation from a copy to the original.
Birnbaum (1948) presents his conception of the meaning of courage in a second article. He remarks that since the days of Plato, courage has remained on the outskirts of psychology.

He makes the statement

that its decisive part in common life is known and assumes that the
reader is well aware of this decisive role which courage plays in everyday life. He stresses the need for a psychology of courage which focuses its attention on courage and discouragement.

Birnbaum then proceeds

with a detailed, and somewhat repetitive treatise on courage. Discouragement is never again mentioned.
One could, Birnbaum claims, call courage a total attitude,
which involves all aspects of the human being. This "Totaleinstellung"
seems to encompass cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of the
person.

Thus, courage can be understood as an active concept, one which

demands action and change.
Birnbaum attempts to differentiate the active courage of the
healthy person from that of the neurotic, who he claims, is also active.
Self-confidence will not adequately differentiate the two. The courageous person fulfils the condition of solving problems or the "tasks of
life" in the right manner.

This definition of the courage of the healthy

person is quite similar to Adler's social courage.
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Birnbaum, by attributing to courage the status of an attitude,
attempts to separate it from behaviourism.

He states that behaviourists

would define courage as "the impression of the behaviour of a human being who solves the tasks of life" (p. 16). The resultant activity would
be courage.

Such a conception of courage, Birnbaum claims,is almost too

simple to be true.

If pure activity were all that courage entailed, then

he feels that we might also rightfully attribute courage to dogs.
To link courage with human beings he adds his "geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie".

Solving the tasks of life correctly involves

placing value on your experiences.

Action is the symbol of a man's value

and herein lies the difference between animals and humans.

Birnbaum

states:
The courageous person is from the standpoint of 'geisteswissenschaftliche psychologie' a responsible person who
recognizes his deeds as symbols of his values and who does
what is prescribed by an objective system of values. He
obeys to a demand (like the animals do) but it is the demand to be of value. From here, courage is the enhancement of the value of the self, of one's values, or more
precisely, it is the preservation of the value of the self.
(p. 18)
The three basic components of courage postulated by Birnbaum might be
summarized as follows:
1)

Courage is an attitude, a total experience or "totaleinstellung", founded on self-confidence.

2)

Courage is the correct solving of the problems of living,
facing and meeting the tasks of life.

3)

Courage is the preservation of an objective value of the
self which expresses itself in deeds, (p. 19)

Birnbaum's three components of courage might be labelled as "Cognitive",
"Behavioural" and "Affective".

Contemporary conceptions of courage will

be considered within such a "total" framework.
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Summary Explanations
Philosophi cal
Traditional conceptions of courage which place emphasis on
manliness and strength in war, and value as an ideal moral courage and
a general striving towards life, can be understood within the framework
of early philosophical conceptions of courage.

Tillich (1952) summar-

izes the early philosophers' definitions of courage.
The emphasis placed by Moran (1945) and Slim (1957) on reason
and will power as being the primary component of courage strongly reflects the Stoic conceptions of the courage to be.

Tillich states that

Stoic courage was based on the control of reason.

This reason refers to

the person's core being, his center, and includes all mental functions.
Still, Tillich states: "reasoning as a limited cognitive function, never
could create courage" (pp. 12-13).

Clausewitz's claim that courage is

not an act of understanding, or a totally cognitive function, may also
stem from the Stoic view.
Nietzsche's ontology of courage (Tillich, p. 30) relates to
conceptions of courage and fear by writers of the war tradition. They
acknowledged the presence of fear but stressed the power of reason and
will in facing and thus overcoming fear. Nietzsche states:

"...he hath

heart who knoweth fear but vanquisheth it; who seeth the abyss, but with
pride. He who seeth the abyss but with eagle's eyes, - he who with the
eagle's talons graspeth the abyss: he hath courage" (in Tillich, 1952).
Stoic courage was also viewed as belonging to the Slite.
this conception of courage may stem Moran's definite social
The general elitism,

From

elitism.

the definite sexism, and the description of courage
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within the context of war can all be understood in light of Tillich's
discussion of the "aristocratic tradition" (p. 5 ) . In this era war was
the realm of the aristocracy. As a result, courage was also linked with
the Slite.

This "heroic-aristocratic" conception of courage, which was

revived by the knights of the Middle Ages, may be what Moran is referring
to when he spoke of the fearless primitive soldiers. The greatest test
of courage, Tillich claims, was a readiness to make the greatest sacrifice, one's life. The soldier was required by his profession to be always ready for this sacrifice. Thus, the soldier's courage was and
somehow still remains, the outstanding example of courage.
The sexism inherent in courage can be understood on the basis
of the words employed to connote courage. The Greek word for courage,
andrSia,

can be translated as "manliness" (Tillich, p. 5). The Latin

word, fortitude,

means "strength" and thus may explain the military con-

notations of the word courage.
The death of the aristocratic tradition gave rise to what
Tillich terms a "rational-democratic" (p. 5) conception of courage.
Courage was now defined as the universal knowledge of good and evil.
The value placed on mind over matter, on the ethical components of moral
courage, and the religious determinism of courage all appear to reflect
the dominant thinking of this era.

Linguistic derivations of courage

(Fr. "coeur" and Gm. "mut") suggest that courage is also a matter of the
heart.
Aquinas, as did writers of the religious tradition, felt that
perfect courage was a gift of "the Divine Spirit" (p. 8). Courage was
united with the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. This relates
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to Slim's conception of courage as the basic virtue. Faith and hope,
Tillich says, reflect the ontological nature of courage, whereas love
reflects its ethical component.
Aristotle's conception of the courageous man, Tillich states,
is one who "acts for the sake of what is noble, for that is the aim of
virtue" (p. 4). Courage does what is to be praised.
Tillich defines the early view of courage as an ethical concept, as a human act, as a matter of value (p. 3). This, in addition
to the views presented of courage being a Divine Gift and a virtue,
might explain the emphasis placed on moral courage as an ideal. This
was especially evident in the religious writers cited.
The view presented by Meerloo as to the value of life and the
emphasis placed on the mind or non-action characteristic of moral courage also appears to stem from early philosophers.

For Aquinas, courage

was a strength of the mind and was united with wisdom.

Courage was a

virtue representing not only the unity of the four cardinal virtues, but
was also subordinate to reason (Tillich, p. 7). Nietzsche's "will to
power", Tillich states, connotes a striving towards life. A life which
is willing to surpass itself is the good life. The good life is also
the courageous life (p. 27).
Birnbaum's emphasis on the human aspect of courage is quite
probably linked with Plato's rejection of animal courage (Tillich,
p. 80-81).
Psychological
The literature reviewed seems to indicate a definite and widespread attachment to traditional conceptions of courage. This belief in
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specifically defined modes of demonstrating one's courage may be explained within the context of several psychological theories.
Atkin (1971) examined the individual's motivations for participating in what he terms the "ritualized behaviour" (p. 579) of the war
institution.

This war institution, he claims, is "ego-syntonic" (p. 561)

and thus quite acceptable to the individual's morality.

Thus, patriotism,

or the exaltation of one's group, may be viewed as a"legitimate, acceptable, rationalized displacement of the individual's narcissism" (p. 561).
He speaks of a "socially determined character formation" (p. 569) wherein most people will comply with the demands of the state. They will respond readily to orders given by the state.
The process of identification with one's peers and internalization of social ideas and values, Atkin claims, results in the individual's identification with the values of his culture (p. 572). The resultant conformity is largely unconscious. The individual obeys cultural
demands with relatively little awareness.
Atkin's social-psychoanalytic theory and the concept of internalization could therefore explain the need to express one's courage, or
to prove one's manhood via specific and perhaps ritualized forms of
behaviour.

He describes this process of internalization as "a restruc-

turing and a synthesis of the social, cultural, and moral ideas into the
individual's ego...they become a part of the 'me'" (p. 578). Thus the
need to prove yourself courageous may be an integral and unconscious
aspect of the social self.

Courage, as a cultural value, may reside

mainly within the unconscious. Courageous behaviour could be likened to
a social role to which the individual conforms.
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Traditional courage, especially within the context of war, may
be primarily a function of conformity.

Statements by soldiers that they

are "only following orders" (p. 73), Charny (1971) claims, indicates a
definite lack of personal convictions. This may suggest a lack of personal involvement or conscious self-determination when conforming to
culturally-defined modes of exhibiting courage.
courage may not involve a real decision.
agreement with the majority.

In fact, traditional

Conformity would suggest

Courage within this context may

simply be the understood or implicit manner of behaving.

The emphasis

placed on courage as being primarily a prescribed response, would seem
to render traditional courage the status of a relatively "riskless"
decision.
Traditional conceptions of courage and its expression in war
may be understood within the framework of Tomkins' "Ideo-affective resonance theory".

Eckhardt and Alcock (1970) were successful in their efforts

to establish an empirical link between ideology and personality for war/
peace attitudes. Their results indicated the following:
Ideological conservatism at home and militarism abroad were
largely associated with personal extraversion, which may be
interpreted as thoughtless conformity or acting without
thinking. Political cynicism was largely associated with
neuroticism and social irresponsibility. Both factors shared
an ideological lack of internationalism and personal misanthropy, strict childhood discipline (as recalled) and lack of
empathy... (p. 109)
The general factor of "compulsion" was isolated as the underlying explanatory value for the link between ideological and personality factors. The
authors hypothesized that this general value may be culturally determined.
The "love affair" (p. 105) between the idea (war) and the feeling (courage) may be a matter of values. The underlying value of
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"compulsion" was defined by Eckhardt and Alcock as "a readiness to use
force or the threat of force, punishment or the threat of punishment,
as a means of controlling human behaviour and of resolving conflict
situations" (p. 107). This might lend support to the assumption that
courage and its traditional relationships to war and to religious beliefs
may have their basis in a common value. The correlation of "thoughtless
conformity or acting without thinking" may lend support to the assumption that traditional courage is primarily response-oriented.

The self

may play only a minor role.
The concept of "national role" (Katz, 1967, p. 16) and conceptions of "symbolic", "normative" or "instrumental involvement" (p. 17)
might serve as explanations for the expressed adherence to traditional
courage.

Given that an individual is a formal member of a national sys-

tem, declaration of war, or involvement in a war by the nation would
necessitate the activation of the national role of "soldier" (Katz, 1967).
Thus, necessarily placing the role of courage within the context of war
would imply that courage may also be related to the concept of national
role.

The emphasis on conformity and the consequence for deviancy from

one's national role is explained by Katz.

He states:

"As a member of

the national system, the individual must either assume his national role
or leave the system.

And there are no places to go save prison or exile"

(p. 16). Traditional courage may therefore be viewed as a necessary byproduct or result of the automatic conformity to or assumption of one's
national role.
Katz further defines symbolic attachment to a bureaucratic
system as "emotionally held attitudes in which the symbols represent
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absolute values and have a life of their own" (p. 17). An individual
who views courage or heroism in war not only as a means towards victory •
but as a value, as an end in itself, could be regarded as having a
"symbolic attachment" to traditional conceptions of courage. The physical courage of sports and the honour and fame attributed to sports heroes
might indicate or imply such a symbolic attachment. Katz suggests that
such symbolic attachment has its basis in the emotional conditioning of
children to these symbols.
Adherence to traditional religious conceptions of courage as a
patient and persevering attitude towards troubles in life might be explained by Katz's conception of "normative involvement". He defines this
as "the acceptance of specific legitimate requirements of the system necessary for system membership" (p. 17). People may not be totally attached
to religion per se, but they fulfil the requirements of attending church
and labelling themselves as one sect or another.

Official commitments

may be limited to specific rituals such as the marriage ceremony.

The

general optimism of their lifestyles and the belief that struggles are
necessary in order to build character (e.g., Moore, 1951) suggests a
"normative involvement" of sorts. People may adhere to traditional religious norms without symbolic attachments to the symbols of church and formal religion. With regards to courage and war, normative attachment
would describe the man who may not totally agree with the war but serves
his time regardless. Glasser (1971) comments in 365 Days:
If they had to they'd go again and again. It wasn't because
they wanted to or even believed in what they were doing, but
because they were there and someone told them to do it.
Strange war. Going for something they didn't believe in or
for that matter didn't care about, just to make it 365 days
and be done with it. (p. 26)
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A Basic Explanatory Model
The S

R or Traditional Model

Within the framework of this model, primary emphasis is placed
on the Response, the courageous action. Physical courage, as demonstrated on the battlefield or the sports arena, in addition to a blind adherence to a religious normative lifestyle, may be explained within the
framework of the traditional model. Psychoanalytic theory suggests that
adherence to this model may be largely unconscious.

Social-psychological

theories explain the traditional model in terms of conformity behaviour.
Implicit in conformity to traditional conceptions of courage
are positive reinforcements such as being labelled a "hero" or "courageous", having your overt behaviour viewed as "right" or "good" and
generally being accepted by the social majority. The exemplar of this
model may take few genuine risks with respect to social behaviour. He
is courageous because he is a carbon copy of what society would like him
to be.
A Schematic Summary
Stimulus (external to the
individual)

Response (a socially prescribed overt behaviour)

e.g., war, sports, hardships in life

e.g., obey the draft, be a
champion, patient
perseverance, etc.

Origin:

primarily external, i.e., social class, race, God,
religion

Operational Definitions:

to remain with your Company, your team
or at your post at all costs, and to
the dire end
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Contemporary Illustrations of the Traditional Model
In newspapers we read frequently of people being awarded
metals for their heroism.

The following was noted in the K-W Record

(Thursday, July 6, 1972):
Five Canadians, three from New Brunswick and two from
Ontario, have been awarded bronze medals for heroism in
saving lives, the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission announced
Wednesday.
This suggests that courage might also be explained within the framework
of prosocial behaviour or altruism.
In the land of the Israelis, the Pillar of Heroism firmly
attests to the traditional conception of courage:
a simple severe triangular shaft of stainless steel which
rises 70 feet high on this Judean Hill. Deeds of Jewish
valor are carved into the surrounding stones. (Golden, p. 83)
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COURAGE AND SURVIVAL
Traditional conceptions of courage conspicuously minimize the
role of the inner self, or the personal involvement aspect of courage.
References to courage within the context of survival, to the contrary,
appear to place considerable emphasis on the central role of a strong
self, a hopeful attitude and the maintenance of dignity and autonomy in
life-threatening situations. Emphasis on the conscious and purposeful
nature of courage (Frankl, 1963; Bettleheim, 1960), the concept of selfreliance (Frank, 1952; Schnabel, 1958; Leboucher, 1969; Munden, 1973;
Brantner, 1971; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1973), and the necessity of interacting with others (Pawlowlcz, 1962), suggests that courage may be a
more complex psychological process than traditional conceptions would
imply.
Frequent references are made to the concept of hope by all of
the above authors. The resultant confusion as to the relationship beween courage and hope further complicates any attempts to define courage
adequately within the context of survival. The great variety of survival
situations and discussions of the multitude of coping mechanisms found
therein (Noyce, 1962; Evans & Cody, 1969; Hansell, 1970; Bloch, 1969,
1970; Chodoff, 1970; Glassman & Siegel, 1970; Hinton, 1973; Lilly, 1956;
Colbach, 1971), also suggests the need for a more adequate definition
of courage and its specific role in survival and other stressful situations .
50
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Frankl (1963), on the basis of his experience in a concentration camp, spoke of the courage to suffer. He described this courage as
an attitude, a state of mind and a choice. Of primary importance was
the manner in which one survived the ordeal of the concentration camps.
Frankl emphasized the ultimate decision each individual could make in
accepting suffering and the probability of death in a dignified and hopeful manner.
Speaking of the necessity of a sense of humour for survival
(Frankl, 1963) suggests that some basic personality pre-dispositions may
also be essential. One might conceive of "humour" as a mediating variable which may serve to explain the existence of courage and hence the
survival of some individuals.

"A sense of humour", Frankl remarked "was

another of the soul's weapons in the fight for self-preservation" (p. 68).
It provided a brief spell of freedom from suffering.
The ability to choose one's attitude in any given situation,
Frankl claimed, comprises man's ultimate freedom.

Thus, the decision to

live or die in the concentration camp and the subsequent maintenance of
personal dignity, resides ultimately within man himself. The decision
to cope with one's situation in a hopeful frame of mind does much to
strengthen one's physical and mental endurance capabilities. Thus, implicit in the courage to suffer is not only the endurance and perseverance found in traditional conceptions of courage, but, a more basic selfdetermination .
The general hopelessness of the concentration camp and the
constant presence of death, led many to entertain thoughts of suicide.
In order to survive, it was necessary to maintain a belief in the future
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and never to lose hope.

Implicit in hopelessness was the ultimate

suicide of the "Moslems". They were not merely apathetic and hardened
emotionally to their environment, as were the majority. Rather, Frankl
described them as completely lifeless and without hope. They were mere
shells of the beings they once were and had ceased to react even to the
basic necessities of life.
Suffering was regarded by Frankl as an intricate and meaningful
aspect of life. The decision to suffer courageously, and to die with
dignity if necessary, is presented almost as an imperative.
states:

Frankl

"They must not lose hope but should keep their courage in the

certainty that the hopelessness of their struggle did not detract from
its dignity and its meaning" (p. 130).
Basic to Frankl's notion of successfully maintaining hope and
courage is a strong sense of optimism and future time perspective.

"It

is a peculiarity of man", Frankl claims, "that he can only live by looking to the future" (p. 115). Any man who loses faith in the future is
doomed.

It is this belief in the future, and man's striving towards some

goal, which gives man his inner strength, his capacity to endure.
In the concentration camps, some men began to suffer from what
Frankl termed a "deformed inner time" (p. 112). They began to live from
day to day, totally in the present.

They ceased setting future goals

and looked retrospectively into the past for comfort. Others began to
concentrate exclusively on the past. This provided them with a source
of relief.

The danger inherent in this mode of coping was that they

overlooked the reality of their situation and missed the opportunity to
grow spiritually and experience something positive from their ordeal.
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The false hopes maintained by some optimists was equally as destructive.
Some would set a date for their liberation or remain convinced that they
would be home again for Christmas. Nonfulfilment of such false hopes
resulted in a loss of courage and subsequent suicide.
Frankl clearly emphasizes the important role of the self in
maintaining courage. He fails, however, to clearly define the interaction, or to distinguish, should that be the case, between courage and
hope.

Both appear to be necessary for survival and the establishment of

a purpose, a future goal, in one's life, even if that life is filled
with suffering.

Frankl states:

Those who know how close the connection is between the state
of mind of a man - his courage and hope, or lack of them and state of immunity of his body will understand that the
sudden loss of hope and courage can have a deadly effect.
(p. 120)
Also, both courage and hope appear to stem from a belief in the future
and a personal decision to render one's present suffering as somewhat
meaningful.

This confusion leads one to wonder whether courage and hope

are not one and the same.
Bettleheim (1960) spoke of the concentration camp as a dehumanizing situation. His conception of courage emphasizes the necessity
of actively maintaining a strong, independent, dignified and psychologically autonomous self.

Courage involves the conscious decision to main-

tain one's self-respect. Bettleheim's emphasis on the self-determined
aspect of courage is very similar to Frankl (1963).

From a strong self

will arise the courage to face the reality of one's situation, however
grim it may be.

The key to survival was to "join reason with the heart",

to decide that one was going to maintain his personal integrity.
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Bettleheim's conception of courage and survival in the concentration camp situation adds to the basic distinction made by Meerloo
(1944) between the courage to live and the courage to die. Bettleheim
claims that a dignified death, wherein the life of the personality is
retained, is far superior qualitatively to the undignified death of those
"Moslems" whose already dead personalities constituted virtual suicide.
Pioneer contributions of psychologists described the courage
to live as merely a preferred value. This value, in turn, led to the
specific response of living as opposed to dying in battle. Bettleheim,
in discussing the courage to live within the context of extreme survival
situations, stresses the role of the self. Emphasis is placed on the
psychological process of choosing life over death and assuming a dignified courage.

One readily risks the probability of physical death in

order to ensure the psychological life of the personality.

Courage in-

volves the maintenance of some semblance of independence in the midst of
control.
Again, as in Frankl (1963), endurance and perseverance involve
much more than simply remaining in the situation.

In fact, defying the

authoritarian control of their captors by attempting to escape from the
camp, was indicative of courage.
still alive.

It was a sign

that the personality was

Implicit in courage is the execution of a conscious deci-

sion to survive psychologically, at all costs.
The importance of self-reliance in producing and sustaining
the necessary courage to withstand the stress of war is exemplified in
the story of Anne Frank (1952).

She was constantly striving to increase

her inner strength through her own efforts. Anne felt that she must become good through her own efforts without examples and without good advice.
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Then, later she would be a stronger individual. She renewed and
strengthened her courage by writing and continuously telling herself:
"I must, I must, I must" be brave (p. 177). Anne felt the need to grow
in spite of her restricted confinement. She was aware of the need to be
strong, to be brave and to never give up. All this she felt was dependent on her own self. Anne stated:

"alone I had to face the difficult

task of changing myself" (p. 155).
The importance of self-reliance in coping with stress is also
emphasized in areas where courage is popularly ascribed the leading role.
Quarantelli and Dynes (1973) state that self-reliance and the ability to
cope with a disaster situation are more prevalent than is generally realized.

Relief agencies and outside assistance, except for cases where

specialized equipment or medical care is necessary, are not a central
requirement. Heroism in disaster situations is not as dramatic as people
imagine it to be.

In spite of these facts, traditional conceptions of

courage are still the ideal. An example provided by Quarantelli & Dynes
is the undue stress placed on the superhuman efforts of a particular
person in a rescue operation.

The authors found it ironic that disaster

victims were usually the first to believe such dramatic accounts of their
suffering and heroism.

They took pride in thinking of their own exper-

ience as typical and heroic.
Quarantelli & Dynes conclude with the thought that perhaps
heroism is not the wrong word to describe disaster behaviour.

Their con-

ception of courage, however, involves much more than the ideal, overpublicized, and perhaps mis-represented notion of heroism in disaster
situations. Their definition of courage involves a quiet determination,
practical forethought, and a self-reliant coping with stress.
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The central role of the self in courage is also noted by
Munden (1973).

Courage he feels, belongs within the realm of the psy-

chologically healthy individual. He presents the interesting view that
"mental illness is an expression of individual cowardice" (p. 71).
Courage and hence mental health, must be freely chosen. He confuses the
issue somewhat by introducing the concept of hope. Those patients who
undergo positive personality changes, he claims, "do so out of despair...
the fear of losing all hope in life" (p. 70). Thus, one wonders whether
the basic mechanism for psychological survival is a self-determined
choice of courage or a fear of losing hope.
In addition to the seeming interchangeability of courage and
hope, accounts of courage and survival introduce another source of confusion.

Frequent reference is made to the role of an other, an external

aid or influence, in the maintenance of courage and/or hope in times of
stress.
Sala Pawlowicz (1962) attributes her ultimate survival of the
concentration camp experience to the renewed strength and hope which
another's caring produced.

Her own courage and active hopes for the

future seemed almost totally depleted.

All hope seemed gone and Sala

found herself simply surviving from moment to moment.
the past because it hurt too much to remember.

She blotted out

She did not think of the

future because it seemed that there was no longer any hope for a future.
Sheer endurance and survival in the present were her modes of coping.
In the midst of this hopelessness and of ultimate fatalism,
she found a renewed sense of worth, of being, and a renewed courage. A
stranger had left her a message, carefully concealed, a small crust of
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black bread, a symbol of hope.
and the courage to defy.

This in turn gave her the will to endure

She no longer felt alone.

Of note is the fact that Sala attributed the source of this
renwed courage and hope not to her secret benefactor, but to God, a
Divine source.
intervened.

She remarked:

"At just the right time Divine Will had

I prayed to have the strength to bear the burden of respons-

ibility that this note had placed upon me.

I could not lose myself..."

(p. 142). Careful analysis of the environmental conditions surrounding
her may provide a clue.
Sala experienced her oppressors as being totally bent on destruction.

She herself was experiencing a slow yielding to this destruc-

tive force. Her self-image as a human being, one with dignity, selfrespect and freedom to determine her own destiny, was slowly being undermined.

Sala states:

I reflected that my degradation was probably exactly what
the Nazis wanted. The hunger, humiliation and constant
beatings made us begin to believe that we actually were
sub-human. We had no human rights, and were treated like
so many animals. With the loss of dignity, came the loss
of a will to live. We behaved like sheep, I thought,
because we had lost the sense of pride and dignity that
normal people had. The Nazis seemed to control our lives
so completely that there was never any hope of escape.
(Pawlowicz, p. 146)
Attributing her renewed courage and hope to a human source was not possible.

The Nazis were no longer regarded as human and the self-image of

the Jews also approached that of being sub-human.
This confusing definition of courage and hope as both primarily
self and other determined is also found in other accounts of concentration camp and war experiences (Frank, 1952; Leboucher, 1969).

Both inner

determination and the resolution to help a loved one provided the necessary
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strength for Mme. Leboucher.

Father Benoit's formula of "work and pray"

(p. 27, Leboucher) also seems to place equal emphasis on the role of God
and man as sources of inner courage and hope. Anne Frank, who placed
such great emphasis on self-reliance, also is noted as saying: "We
stayed together - that much good fortune we still had.

Perhaps that is

why we endured longer than the others who were all alone...we now began
to see that misery is not doubled when it is shared" (Schnabel, 1958,
p. 164).
To further complicate the issue, Bettleheim (1960) claims that
the attempt made by the Frank's to remain together in such abnormal circumstances resulted in their deaths. He feels they made a mistake in
attempting to continue life as normal. Anne's death followed shortly
after her sister Margot's in the concentration camp.
Issues of survival from a slightly different perspective
(Hinton, J. "Bearing Cancer", 1973; & Brantner, J. P., "Death and the
Self", 1971) also make reference to courage and hope, self-reliance and
the necessity of others. Hinton views courage and hope as one of the
many factors which contribute to a person's ability to cope with cancer.
Approximately one-third reacted to the diagnosis of cancer by maintaining
hope and striving towards establishing limited goals towards independence.
The rest spoke of "acceptance" or "despondence" and some chose to completely ignore their burden. Hinton speaks vaguely of patients bearing
the experience with a "quieter courage".

One gains the vague impression

that perhaps courage and hope, as modes of coping with a possibly terminal illness, may be somewhat superior qualitatively to other modes of
coping.
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Brantner maintains that certain attitudes may promote survival
and could, in some instance, prolong life. He quotes Troebst with respect to disaster and emergency situations and states that survivors more
often considered the possibility of a disaster in advance. They were
also quite prepared to do something about their situation.

Thus, cogni-

tive forethought and subsequent self-reliant action appear to characterize courage. Of the survivors, Brantner states: "they refuse to let
themselves be depressed or discouraged or hopeless or despairing" (p. 22).
Brantner also predicted that the presence of certain conditions
in women with non-cancerous pap smears would result in cancer of the cervix.

"Hopelessness" as well as "recent death or separation" were among

the variables. His predictions distinguishing those who developed cancer
from patients who remained in good health were approximately 75% accurate.
Thus,hope and the presence of another person may be central for survival.
Brantner refers to hopelessness and discouragement as dangerous
conditions which can be dealt with and overcome "by our own efforts and
with the help of professional people" (p. 24). The development of the
self, he feels, should be our main goal in life, and "this is accomplished only in relationships with other persons" (p. 25). His comment that
"hope is necessary for life" (p. 24) does little to clarify the definitional dilemma.
Courage and Hope
To differentiate courage and hope seems a difficult yet necessary task. Hope more often appears to designate a mental disposition or
attitude.

This is somewhat confusing, since courage has also been de-

fined as a mental attitude by many of the authors mentioned.

The
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difference, however, appears to lie in the action component which
appears necessary in order to distinguish courage as such.
Hope does not necessarily require action to demonstrate to
others that it exists. Take the example:
to go back".

"I hope I have the courage

One could spend the rest of one's life hoping and due to

unmitigating circumstances, never actually return. Yet, actually going
back would demonstrate that one had the courage to do so. Similarly,
public voicing of one's opinions would demonstrate that one had the courage to act on one's convictions.

It would demonstrate that one really

wanted to be a part of change rather than merely hoping that someday
things would be different.

Courage implies committing oneself to action

whereas hope may serve as an attitude which sustains that courage.
Hope also appears to be more of an intensely personal phenomenon whereas courage frequently appears to involve others. For example,
a person may hope to be wealthy someday. While this hope may indeed
require action on his part in order to materialize, it need not necessarily be verified or publically observed by others in order to be termed
as a hope.

Courage is more other oriented, more external.

For example,

actions such as jumping into a river to save a drowning child, or voicing
one's opinions publically, are often labelled as "courageous". Courage
implies publically observable actions. A person can hope, and no one
need agree with him in order for him to be certain that he is indeed
hoping for something. Yet, in order to believe that he is courageous,
it is necessary for him to conform to others' conceptions of heroism and
hope to merit the label. Courage appears to require public support.
Hope appears to require only private, personal support.

61
A further distinction stems from the above. Due to the seemingly private nature of hoping, one could hope theoretically for anything one wished.

It would still be termed a hope. Yet, due perhaps

to the public nature of courage, only certain prescribed actions are
generally labelled as courageous. Heroic actions in war or disaster
situations are an example. Other behaviours, such as draft-resistance,
might not be considered courageous by the prevailing majority.

Society

has created the label of "coward" for such deviance.
Fromm, in speaking of courage and hope (1968) stressed the
importance of activity in both courage and hope. He conceived of passivity as pathological. Hope and courage thus appear closely linked and
related to change and action in the world.

Passive hope, where nothing

is done, says Fromm, constitutes no hope. What is needed is an active
hope and an active courage, since courage is regarded by Fromm as being
the necessary component to life.
Personal accounts of concentration camp experiences readily
illustrate the distinction between passive and active hope.

Sheer endur-

ance in the present, while still maintaining some small semblance of a
will to live, with minimal reliance on the past or future, could be viewed as passive hope. An active hope, in view of its future-orientation,
goes beyond simple physical endurance.
This conception of time perspective again creates a distinction
between courage and hope. Hope appears to involve a more limited and
narrow time span than courage. Active hope has a well defined future
orientation.

Passive hope centers mainly on the present.

passes a wider time span.

Courage encom-

It incorporates past, present and/or future
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time perspectives, as the situations require.

Courage can draw the

future into the present by realizing hopes. Courage can project the
present into the future, in terms of actualizing potentialities, in acting out hopes. Also, courage can create a past, figuratively speaking,
by concretizing memories through action in the present (Frankl, 1963).
Hopelessness appears to entail ending the struggle for life
in the midst of stress or suffering.
suicide.

Giving up hope may be a type of

Courage also appears to be implicitly involved in the mainten-

ance of both life and hope in survival situations. Hope, a more private
phenomenon, at once sustains courage and appears to be bolstered by it.
The two concepts may be better viewed as exemplifying an inter-dependent
rather than an independent relationship. They both appear basic to the
continuing life process.

The distinction between courage and hope may

be more legitimately expressed on the basis of emphasized origin, that
is, external or other, versus internal or the self.
The following theoretical model may illustrate more clearly
the above conceptions:
Courage-Hope Model
Other
Hope^

Self
;> Courage

Solid Lines: These denote the necessary links in the model. They exemplify the important factors for ultimate survival and the existence of
courage and/or hope.
Broken Lines: These denote sufficient but not necessary links in the
model.

These factors, while important, are secondary.

They are always

present to some extent. This stems from the fact that we can be autonomous
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individuals, but only in a relative sense, since we can never be
totally isolated from others. Their influence is not of primary importance for maintaining courage and/or hope.
Changing the secondary link between Other and Courage to a
solid line, or a necessary condition would exemplify traditional conceptions of courage.

Relegating to the Other a position of primary import-

ance would clearly indicate the necessity of conformity behaviour.
Relegating primary importance to the Other with respect to hope
implies not conformity but the presence of the necessary support or incentive crucial to hope.

In order for hope to be active, and hence non-

pathological and constructive, it requires a link with the outside world.
Given this link, it can actively support courage. The notion of personal
responsibility to sustain this courage through a basic hope and selfreliance completes the cycle.
Maintaining a weak link between hope and the other, and strengthening the link between self and hope would only serve to isolate the individual.

Such a configuration would merely strengthen the already pri-

vate nature of hope and reduce contact with the outside world.

The con-

ceptions of courage, survival and mental health would apply here.
Alternative Explanations of Coping in Survival Situations
Discussion of the role courage and hope play in coping in survival and stressful situations have centered generally upon the necessity
for maintaining a basic will to live. There are, however, studies ranging across the same survival categories (i.e., mental and physical health,
the stress of war and concentration camps) which make no mention of courage or hope as primary coping mechanisms.
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Evans and Cody (1969) and Hansell (1970) discuss coping with
stress in the field of mental health.

The technique of decision coun-

selling is primarily a cognitive approach.

Immediate intervention by

professional counsellors and treatment within the crisis situation where
possible is the ideal approach.

Stress is placed on carefully assessing

the crisis situation and teaching new problem-solving skills to the
patient. Allowing the patient to remain within his normal environment
and employing those already interacting with him in his problem-solving
task, the authors feel will enhance his sense of dignity.
Psychological survival, as described above, appears to be
primarily dependent upon the individual's capacity to learn new coping
techniques.

Both the expectation of others that he will succeed and the

specific coping mechanisms taught are external to the individual. Selfreliance and courage does not really appear central in decision counselling. Even personal hope appears subsumed under others' expectations
of success.
Considerable attention has been given to the soldier's adaptation to the stress of war.

Bourne (1970) maintains that "A state of

psychological and even physiological homeostatis can be maintained despite repeated exposure to objectively high-risk situations" (p. 186).
Extensive psychological defenses, rather than courage or hope, are provided as explanations for survival. Bourne includes factors such as
religious beliefs, and careful cognitive calculation of the risk involved,
as being characteristic of survivors. The mention of "independent, selfreliant individuals with inordinate faith in their own abilities" (p. 186)
seems to approach the definition of courage thus far evolved in this
paper.
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Bourne claims that the symptoms exhibited by soldiers or their
particular modes of coping are not of primary concern.

Of importance is

the end result. Bourne states: "to a certain extent the actual presenting symptoms became irrelevant:

the critical issue is whether or not

the man has ceased to cope with or function in the environment of the
combat zone" (p. 187).
Treatment of psychiatric casualties within the war zone centered upon the concepts of "immediacy, proximity and expectancy" (Bloch,
1969; Hayes, 1969).

The use of drugs such as marijuana as a coping de-

vice (Colbach, 1971) was viewed as being of minimal concern since it had
not yet presented itself as a pressing problem in combat.
The efforts expended to keep the soldier in battle very clearly exemplify traditional conceptions of courage. Discussion of how the
individual soldier copes with the stress of war seems to indicate a need
for a qualitative distinction with respect to the courage of those who
externally fit the traditional definition.
Bloch (1970) in discussing the adaptation, psychologically, of
normal individuals during a term in Viet Nam indicates that fears of
death and injury were predominant.

In cases where a man's ability to

cope with these fears is questionable, Bloch states: "the quality of his
relationship with his peer group can often be the determining factor in
whether he 'makes it' (functions effectively) or doesn't" (p. 620).
Due to the nature of the Viet Nam tour, however, such group
cohesiveness or support is not as strong as it was in previous wars.
soldier knows that in 365 Days his time is up.

A

Thus he concentrates on

maintaining ties at home and does not become as closely affiliated to his
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combat group.

One might predict, on the basis of the postulated theor-

etical courage-hope model (p. 62), the quality of an individual's adjustment in war.
Given lower group cohesiveness, one might expect that the person who copes best might be high in self-reliance.

This would foster a

self-determined courage to survive. The necessary hope, to sustain this
courage, can readily be satisfied through relatively tenuous or infrequent emotional support from significant others. These others may be
loved ones at home. In order to sustain an adequate level of hope, it
might also be predicted that the individual has a relatively low Need
for Affiliation (N-Aff.).

In World War II, where time to be spent in

combat was indefinite, and hence, attachment to one's group more important,
other factors may have been primary.

In the latter situation, a high

N-Affillation might have provided the necessary hope for survival. The
highly self-reliant individual, in such a situation, isolated both from
home and immediate affiliation with his peers, might experience minimal
hope and hence the faltering of courage.
Thus, the theoretical courage-hope model, a careful examination
of situational variables and measures of self-reliance and N-Aff. combined, might provide a fairly accurate prediction of a person's survival
potential.
Psychological adaptation to extreme stress as experienced in
the concentration camps was examined by Chodoff (1970). He indicated
that a person's basic personality strengths and weaknesses play a major
role in subsequent adaptation to the post-war period. With respect to
immediate survival within the camps, Chodoff maintains both that he has
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no real answers and that defense mechanisms played a major role. He
claims that chance and the "adaptability of the human species" (p. 82)
accounted for life or death in the camps. The primary defense mechanisms
were apathy, denial and isolation of affect.
Chodoff makes no mention of courage and refers to hope only
indirectly. He relegates the post-^war "concentration camp syndrome"
(p. 84) with its characteristic psychological problems, in part to "the
disappointment of their idealistic hopes that a better world would now
arise" (p. 83). This may imply that hope and courage could be relevant
variables to investigate, even though they are not directly mentioned as
primary adaptive factors.
The courage of those in the concentration camps often indicated
a high degree of self-reliance.

Also, while some affiliation with an

other was necessary for survival, to provide hope, too great an attachment resulted in death.

Chodoff states:

"some form of companionship

with others was indispensable, since a completely isolated individual
could not have survived in the camps, but the depth of such companionship was usually limited by the overpowering egotistical demands of selfpreservation" (p. 83).
Again, on the basis of the courage-hope model, it might be
assumed that given extreme stress situations, a high N-Affiliation could
prove destructive.

It may produce a hope which is overly dependent on

the physical closeness of others.

In situations of extreme stress or

isolation from others, mere knowledge that the other exists should be
sufficient to provide the necessary degree of hope. A high degree of
self-reliance in turn, would lead to the courage needed for survival.
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Accounts of isolated individuals struggling for survival
(Noyce, 1962) suggests that in the absence of a living companion, as in
the case of Tiiro, a stranded sailor, the person will create such a
presence.

Tiiro had been lost at sea for approximately thirty days.

His partner, Ericson, was dead and lying in the raft. Thus, in situations of extreme stress and isolation, where a person is unable to personally contribute significantly to his ultimate survival, he may project
his need for another and sense it as a presence. This projected presence
might in turn, provide the necessary hope to sustain the courage derived
from his own self-reliance. Thus, a mere desire for an other may be
sufficient to sustain the will to live.
Experimental support for the above contentions may be obtained
from a study of isolation and its effects on the individual (Lilly, 1956).
On the basis of autobiographical studies of isolation, Lilly concluded
that all survivors possess the inner conviction that they will live.
Another equally important factor for some is the knowledge that others
are attempting to rescue them. Hallucinations and delusions are quite
characteristic of strong egos who survive.

These hallucinations appear

to reflect their will to live. He refers both to "destroyer type" and
"saviour type" hallucinations. Lilly hypothesized that the brain remains
active in such stress situations.

Instead of remaining reality-bound,

the brain is left free to fantasize and experience hallucinations.
In his isolation study the absolute intensity of stimulation
was reduced by submerging S in a tank of warm and even-flowing water.
The longest exposure for each of the 2 Ss in the experiment was 3 hours.
They were instructed to inhibit movement and report their experiences
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immediately after the experiment.

Results indicated experiences simi-

lar to real life situations. If a person is alone long enough and if
the level of physical and human stimulation is low enough, the mind turns
inward and projects outward its own contents and processes. The brain,
Lilly concludes, remains active.

Lilly states that even healthy minds

act in this manner when experiencing the stress of isolation.
A Learning Theory Explanation
Mowrer (1960) presents an experimental analogue of courage
which might serve as an explanatory basis for traditional (S-R) conceptions of courage and courage in survival situations. Mowrer employed
rats as Ss and a maze apparatus with an electrical grid on the runway.
Electrical shock, a painful stimulus, was the barrier to the reinforcement or goal at the end of the maze.
Courage is defined by Mowrer as an acquired characteristic.
Describing behaviour as either cowardly or courageous is a function of
how the opposing forces in a conflict situation are balanced.

These

opposing forces are defined by Mowrer as being fear and hope. This balance of fear and hope is described by Mowrer as follows:
If much fear and little hope are associated with stimuli
which a given action produces then, with respect to that
action, the individual is "timid", "cowardly".
If little fear and much hope are associated with stimuli
which a given action produces then the action will be
boldly executed, (pp. 434-435)
Mowrer cites experiments by Muenzinger (1936; 1952; 1954; 1957) which
indicate that at times punishment of a correct response may lead to marked
facilitation in learning.

Some groups of Ss (rats) continued to choose

the alley marked "fear coming" after having crossed the electrical grid.
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Although not attributing the term "courage" to rats, Mowrer claims that
such behaviour in humans would be called courage. He postulates that
courage may simply be the absence of fear in situations where it might
well be expected to be present.
Traditional conceptions of courage popularly define stressful
situations such as going to war or participating in competitive sports
as tests of one's courage and demonstrations of manhood.

The possibility

of death or physical maiming when undergoing such feats might be defined
as painful stimuli. The ideal of the fearless soldier, however, indicates that fear will be minimal. The courageous person, in the traditional sense, is one who through will power (Moran, 1945) and conscious
expectation (Slim, 1957) always has his fear in control. Thus, the
psychological set is to endure the necessary pain associated with actions
designed to achieve the ultimate goal of manhood. Mowrer might define
war as a painful stimulus which is associated with a high degree of hope
and little fear. Inherent in the resultant goal-seeking behaviour is a
strong sense of determinism.

Learning theory and the balance of forces

in a conflict situation (a balance which is in this case, socially prescribed) replaces the vague and unscientific religious, climatic and
ethical determination of popular writers.
Mowrer also introduces the concept of "effort" and perseverance
as an important aspect in overcoming painful barriers to a goal. He
gives the example of placing a rat in a Skinner box and setting the ratio
of bar presses to food pellets (positive reinforcement or goal) at 200:1.
Mowrer states that, given such experimental conditions, the rat would
probably die. However, setting the ratio initially at 20:1 and then
gradually increasing the required bar presses (or effort) would result
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in continued effort and increased output for the reward. Mowrer claims
that such a conception of survival would broaden the psychology of work,
sacrifice and character.

Intermittant as opposed to continuous reinforce-

ment should allow for greater resistance to extinction of the learned
response and hence, greater survival potential.
The conception of courage by traditional religious writers
(e.g., Moore, 1951) as the passive endurance of the necessary hardships
and difficulties in life could readily be explained within Mowrer's
learning theory framework.

The constant temptations with which a Chris-

tian is confronted and general misfortunes of life could be defined as
painful stimuli.

The good Christian is psychologically prepared to ex-

pect such hardships and to expend the necessary efforts enduring them.
Such behaviour is linked to the hope of salvation.

Good luck or success

in life could be defined as intermittant reinforcement, since the general
belief would be that life is a struggle. The emphasis on optimism would
allow for a "low fear" definition of the situation. The gradual exposure
to the harshness of reality provided for children in North American
society would explain survival amidst such difficult conditions as life
provides.
Learning theory analogues of courage and survival do not fit
as well with the conceptions of courage and survival presented in this
paper.

The constant danger and actual presence of death and suffering

in the concentration camps (the painful stimulus) presents some difficulty in assuming that this was a "low fear" and "high hope" condition.
The presence of false hope or optimism in some and their eventual suicide
when these hopes (e.g., freedom and an end to the holocaust at Christmas)
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were not realized cannot be readily explained by Mowrer's model. These
false hopes were obviously not conditioned to the endurance of pain
associated with survival in the camps. Their hopes were conditioned to
the reoccurrence of a familiar event, such as Christmas or re-uniting
with their family.
The notion of gradual habituation to the requirement of increased effort for one's reinforcements also presents a problem.

Although

the existence of prejudice against the Jews may be perceived as a gradual
conditioning to a courageous endurance of pain the exposure to severe
conditions in the concentration camps might be considered a fairly sudden
occurrence.

Still, the victims of the holocaust did not all lose hope

and die immediately.
The distinction between psychological life and physical survival posited by Bettleheim (1960) and the value placed on risking the
latter in order to preserve one's self-respect and autonomy implies freedom of choice. Frankl (1962) considered this choice, of life over death,
an ultimate one belonging to man.

Thus, instead of Mowrer*s postulated

balance of hope and fear explaining survival in the camps, the concept
of a necessary and ultimate choice, or decision-making, serves as an explanatory basis. The notion of exercising one's freedom suggests that a
less highly deterministic model would be more appropriate.
Mowrer cites Brown (1955) who states that all goal-seeking
behaviour involves a detour through pain to some extent. This pain may
be interpreted as effort, apprehension and so forth.

Confusion arises

when the "punishment" is large and obvious while the rewards are suble
and obscure.
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Traditional conceptions of courage could readily be described
by the condition where an individual's goal is known and socially approved.

That is, suffering the physical stress involved in competitive

sports is acknowledged as a rite

de passage

to manhood.

Thus, the osten-

sible reward rather than punishment by pain which is experienced by the
individual, is not defined as "masochism" or pathological.

Rather, one

speaks of "determination", "persistance" and "gumption" (Mowrer, p. 436).
The punishment suffered by some new culture adherents could be
defined as fairly severe (e.g., imprisonment, large fines, future financial insecurity).
ideals.

The goal, however, is covert, e.g., realizing one's

The goal of societal change may be threatening and could tech-

nically be defined as being non-approved.

The rewards for activists,

e.g., inner satisfaction, remain obscure to most onlookers. Thus, draftresistors are characterized as "cowards" and deserving of the punishment
they receive. The following letter was received by Osborne (I Refuse,
1971):
Your kind of chickenhearted scum is what makes America look
ugly. Just a prison sentence is too good for you. You and
your kind should be put before a firing squad, just like all
traitors should be. No one who calls himself a Christian
would even want to look at you. The Christian is a guy who
will gladly kill any Communist or foreign enemy to protect
his country. You're probably a foreigner yourself. I hope
you get it good. (p. 27)
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Response
Action Consistent
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CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF COURAGE
Although psychological literature indicates the need for a
changed conception of courage (Mack, 1969; Markowltz, 1971; Kincaid &
Kincaid, 1971), a clearly defined and contemporaneous conception of
courage is still conspicuously absent. Concomitant with assertions that
courage should be removed from the realm of warfare and the heroic feats
therein are studies which attest to the enduring cultural value of heroism (Ermalinski, 1972) and the need to prove one's manhood through personal physical risk (Moore, 1972).
Mack (1969), in his discussion of the "hero", T. E. Lawrence,
states:

"In Lawrence's case we are concerned with such intangibles as

shifting conceptions of heroism" (p. 121). Mack scorns the persistance
of the British in glorifying the image of the "romantic hero" (p. 119)
as a personally uninvolved and mythically staunch individual. Mack emphasizes the role of important psychological factors in determining
resultant heroic action. In Lawrence's case, Mack states that heroism
was primarily a function of his need for an increased self-regard.

He

interprets Lawrence's heroism in psychoanalytic terms as a "displacement"
(p. 126). By helping others, Lawrence enhanced his own self-esteem.
Aside from stressing the importance of the personal involvement of an individual, Mack provides no further definitions of heroism.
Mack does state definitely that the glory and glamour attached to military heroism is outmoded.

Only a vague conception of this "shifting
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conception of heroism" (p. 127) is provided.

Psychological involvement,

responsibility for resultant public actions and the notion that courage
may involve ethics are the only clues provided by Mack.
Markowltz (1971) links the need for a new conception of courage to personal integrity, belief systems and the pursuit of peace. He
claims that peace is an impossiblity as long as men continue to believe
that "traits developed in war are desirable and that only in war does
man exhibit true courage and deserve the highest medals of honour" (p. 448).
He states that the altruistic acts of heroism in war are at best only a
public relations stance.

Inhumanity to others in war has been aggrand-

ized as an indication of "stamina and conviction" (p. 445). Also, social
value has been attached to the masochism of the soldier and the ethics
of competition and warfare. Markowltz comments:
Recklessness and compulsive martyrdom are not courage.
True courage is based on integrity of belief and on the
willingness to be flexible in these beliefs, to expose
beliefs to criticism and to change them as necessity
requires. Formalized thinking diminishes integrity and
in consequence discourages courageous activity. The Yes
Man, often praised for courage in warfare, would in many
civilian situations be scorned for cowardice, (p. 443-444)
Kincaid and Kincaid (1971) stress the necessity of counselling
for the purpose of peace. No counsellor, they claim, would encourage a
person to commit murder or suicide. They will, however, still "encourage
military enlistment or even advise it as a way of maturing into manhood"
(p. 732). Furthermore, they claim that freedom, autonomy, individual
identity and self-actualization are abrogated by war and militarism.
Counsellors need to change the social attitude which regards pacifists
and resisters as "cowards" (p. 734). They recommend that counsellors
attempt to present alternative images of man.

Courage, bravery and
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masculinity should be re-defined outside the realm of war. Healthy
human development necessitates co-operation and freedom, not warfare and
coercion.
Thus, a new conception of courage would seem to entail several
important factors. The changing emphasis on peace as opposed to warfare
as a societal value appears to provide the stimulus for a cognitive reassessment of courage and heroism.

Attitudes, values and belief systems

appear to comprise an important affective component of contemporary
courage.

Resultant behaviour which is consistent with these new ideals

seems to complete the basis for a new conception of courage.
A Basic Explanatory Model
The S-O-R or Contemporary Model
Implicit in the above model of courage is the notion of relative freedom from traditional role definitions and the behavioural expectations inherent in societal norms. Emphasis has shifted away from
the specific, prescribed nature of the response evident in the traditional model. Contemporary conceptions of courage stress not the specific nature of the response, but rather, the consistency inherent in this
response with one's attitudes, values and/or ideals.
Personal involvement, both cognitive and affective, provides
the basis for subsequent action. These components of courage could be
viewed as mediating variables. Since Responses which are labelled as
"right" or "good" or "heroic" by the majority or ruling strata of society
are being challenged, a certain amount of risk is involved in behaviour
which is consistent with contemporary ideals. Thus, the cognitive component of courage might be understood within the framework of risk-taking
behaviour.

Commitment to changing attitudes and the possibility of
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personality correlates of contemporary courage comprise the affective
component of personal involvement.
The initial stimulus, while still technically external to the
individual, no longer suggests the determinism of the traditional model.
Rather, it functions as a crucial precipitating factor, a pre-requisite
condition for change. The emphasis on personal involvement in the contemporary model and the relative freedom in the subsequent decisionmaking process precludes the possibility of a socially-prescribed response.

The person rather than the external stimulus, determines the

response.
A Schematic Summary
S
(external to
the individual)

0
(cognitive)
(affective)

R
(overt behaviour consistent with attitudes,
values and/or ideals)

e.g., war
changing cultural norms
Origin:

specific events external to the individual such as
American involvement in the Viet Nam war, the emergence of a "Youth Culture" (Keniston, 1965), conceptions of a changing culture (Slater, 1971 - "new"
and "old" cultures)

Operational Definitions: actively working towards change in
a manner consistent with beliefs
e.g., resisting the draft, signing an
anti-war petition, joining a
protest march, etc.
Thus, implicit in contemporary courage are conceptions of
change, consistency and a cognitive re-assessment of one's attitudes,
values and ideals. Some risk is inherent in the decision to act. Relative freedom, as opposed to traditional determinism is the defining characteristic of this model.
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Contemporary conceptions of courage combine the moral courage
of traditional models and the notion of self found in courage and survival into a more comprehensive personal involvement.

The narrowly de-

fined ethical dimensions of traditional moral courage now find expression
as value commitments to changing attitudes and ideals. The conformity
inherent in the traditional model is replaced by the relative freedom of
choice between disparate life-styles. Underlying this choice is a cognitive assessment of the existing culture. The decision to risk personal
involvement through action completes a definition of contemporary courage.
Cultural Change: The "stimulus" for Personal Involvement
Kincaid & Kincaid (1971) discuss the significant impact of the
Viet Nam war. The escalation of the war during the period of 1964-1966,
in conjunction with the rise of Black Power which the authors claim
forced white activists to concentrate on their own community concerns,
produced more than a specific anti-war movement. A genuine peace movement emerged.

Public political action was translated into private life-

styles and a generalized revolt against society.

The emphasis was on

"personal morality and individual responsibility, mutual aid and cooperation, ecology and structural decentralization" (p. 732). Young people
were demanding an end to all war.

Their ideal was international peace.

Markowltz (1971) also comments on the idealism of youth and
their striving for peace.

In contrast to the older generation, he claims

that youth are much more idealistic about the possibilities of peace and
cooperative efforts. He states that they insist on taking seriously
their search for peace and good will in the world.

80
The phenomena of activism and student revolt are viewed by
Kasin (1971) as being "a tragic waste of good human potential" (p. 49).
He discusses the problem of Youth within the context of Sullivan's
Interpersonal Theory and his 6 stages of development. Youth's dream of
Utopias, it'8 striving for a better world and search for human dignity
is understood as the desire for "need fulfillment" (p. 57). The permissiveness of liberal, middle class parents as well as encouragement of
social criticism, curiosity and the pursuit of interests which support
individualism, have left these young people in a type of limbo or unfilfilled existence. Youth is not viewed as being a distinct stage of
development.

Rather, Youth is the result of permissiveness in the

Childhood Stage.
Youth experiences a conflict between ideals and the need to
become adults and fit into society. Underlying this conflict is a state
of tension and fear. Conformity to society's norms and amalgamation
into the mainstream of society are viewed as necessary and inevitable
events.

Those who seek to realize ideals of peace are viewed as post-

poning the inevitable or simply escaping and ignoring their basic fear.
Contemporary courage, if explained within the framework of
Sullivan's theory, would be nothing more than a temporary maladjustment.
The strivings of young people would merely reflect their basic fear of
abandonment by a society which they need in order to fulfil "mutuality
needs".

Thus, youthful expression of ideals would be rooted in fear and

a search for stability, rather than being indicative of courage and the
pursuit of change.
Keniston (in Holme, 1971) does attribute to Youth the status
of a separate stage of development. Youth have passed through the
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adolescent stage of development (e.g., rebellion) but are not prepared
to commit themselves to the tasks of adulthood (e.g., marriage and a
stable career).

Emphasis is placed on commitment to values such as

change, and openness. Youth questions the values of society and chooses
to remain disengaged from an active and committed involvement with established institutions.

Focus is placed on the obvious lack of consistency

between value and practice in adult society.
The definite sense of commitment and the ensuing action, consistent with one's values, inherent in contemporary conceptions of courage, suggests that Youth, as a stage of development, is not an adequate
explanatory framework.

Ambivalence, a psychological characteristic of

Youth, gives way to the sense of commitment characteristic of Adulthood.
The pursuit of a definite role in life, regardless of whether it conforms
to the prescribed roles of the prevailing majority, indicates that one
has entered the Adult stage of development.
As soon as a more definite engagement with society occurswhether this engagement takes the form of a more enduring
commitment to revolution and social change, a more enduring
acceptance of the existing society, or an intermediate
position - youth is over, (in Holme, p. 439)
Thus, contemporary courage might be defined as the commitment,
in Adulthood, to values and ideals originating in Youth. Youth are
allowed, not only the freedom, but the time to seriously question the
values and practices of their society. They choose a life-style involving an active commitment towards change. This activism of young Adults
may find expression both within the system (e.g., Civil Rights Movement)
or outside the system per se (e.g., Peace Movement) (Katz, 1967).
Relevant comments on the characteristics of contemporary youth
are found in Slater (The Pursuit of Loneliness, 1971).

He states that
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youth feel the need to attribute a moral basis to their actions. They
are characterized by a "diffuse moral absolutism" (p. 80) and thus
render every act the status of a moral act. An "ideological justification" (p. 80) underlies their behaviour.
Slater's distinction between the two cultures extant in
America today may serve as an explanatory framework for the emergence
and/or existence of contemporary conceptions of courage. The values of
cooperation, sharing and equalitarianism which characterize the new
culture are taught in early childhood.

Children of protective, child-

oriented middle-class parents are allowed to preserve these values for
a longer period of time than the offspring of working class parents.
Furthermore, Slater states: "His intellectual precocity makes it possible for him to integrate them into an ideological system with which he
can confront the corrosive, life-abusing tendencies of the old culture"
(p. 113). Rather than root this consequence of early childhood training
within the rubric of fear and a need to return to the stability of the
old, Slater attributes to it the status of a stimulus for future positive
change.
For the older generation, adherents of the old culture, the
"ultimate moral reference group is the far right - authoritarian, puritanical, punitive, fundamentalist" (p. 98). Middle-class college students,
adherents of the new culture, employ as
Left.

their reference group the New

The emphasis for new culture adherents are values such as "equal-

itarianism, radical democracy, social justice and social commitment"
(p. 98). Priorities of the old culture, such as competition, secrecy, a
preference for property rights and an emphasis on technology, are reversed by the new culture. The latter value cooperation and openness.
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They emphasize personal rights and place considerable value on human
needs.
The values to which these opposing cultures are committed and
the specific nature of the change their interests are focused on serves
to differentiate contemporary conceptions of courage from more traditional notions. Old culture commitments are to stability.

Old culture

conceptions of change involve technological progress. New culture commitments are to changing norms and life-styles. New culture conceptions
of change have an ideological basis. The focus is on changing values,
attitudes and modes of human interaction.

Thus, commitment, change and

consistency alone do not characterize contemporary courage. Rather, it
is the specific nature of these characteristics which defines contemporary courage. They have their basis in the new culture Slater describes.
Contemporary Courage and Personal Involvement
Cognitive
Risk-taking theories may provide an explanatory framework for
the cognitive component of courage.
goal-seeking behaviour.

Implicit in definitions of risk is

Real-life situations invariably involve a choice

among various goals. Awareness of the decision-making process and of the
differing utilities attached to alternative goals renders the process a
cognitive one. Uncertainty as to the probability of success when deciding upon a specific goal defines the decision as risky.
Contemporary conceptions of courage which involve commitment
to changing values of the new culture imply the necessity of decision

For a further description of the new culture, refer to Keniston, 1965.
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making and cognizance of risk. Conformity to the values and roles
characteristic of the old culture would appear to involve relatively
rlskless decisions. Specific behaviours and/or decisions such as becoming established in a career, joining the army, or "settling down" to
family life are approved by old culture adherents. The alternatives
available are all relatively clear-cut and safe in that they merit definite acceptance by the majority.

The decision to continue involvement

with the new culture, on the other hand, is a risky one. The probability of succeeding in the old culture sense (i.e., material success) is
relatively low. The possibility of rejection along with criminal indictment and/or exile must also be considered.

The probability of

effectiveness of the individual's actions must be weighed.
The decision to follow the risky course of action inevitably
involves some costs. Rejection by the majority of the old culture may
however, be offset by the greater self-esteem and sense of autonomy
which might accompany action consistent with values of the new culture.
Willingness to incur costs such as possible imprisonment or exile rather
than compromise one's values suggests that considerable forethought is
involved.
Recent studies (Ermalinski, 1972; Moore, 1972) attest to the
cultural value of heroism and discuss it within the context of risktaking behaviour.

Ermalinski (1972) investigated the level of risk Ss

were willing to take when death was at stake as opposed to the risk Ss
were willing to incur when their time, money or effort was at stake.
He hypothesized that choosing survival and self-interest over heroism
and unselfish behaviour would both invoke guilt and result in Ss
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over-compensating on the time-money-effort questionnaire.

Results con-

firmed the hypothesis.
Moore (1972) questioned whether adolescents feel the need to
prove their manhood by demonstration of some degree of competence at
personal physical risk.

In primitive societies, Moore claims, survival

was dependent upon physical strength and courage. Manhood was synonymous with the ability to endure pain and the capacity to demonstrate
great strength.

In modern societies, survival is no longer as dependent

upon physical strength and courage. Formal initiation rites involving
physical risk are absent. In the absence of such formal rites

de

pass-

age Moore hypothesized that adolescents, by means of the "dare phenomenon" (p. 249) would create their own challenges and initiation rites
into adulthood.

Results confirmed the hypothesis.

The cultural value of heroism and the definite connection with
risk in the above studies suggests that perhaps Brown's risk-as-value
hypothesis might serve as an explanatory basis for courage. Brown's
hypothesis states that a person usually views himself as being riskier
than his peers. When in a group the individual realizes that he is not
as risky as he initially perceived himself to be. As a result, he shifts
towards the greater risk advocated by the group. When the value expressed by the group is a cautious or conservative one, as opposed to a risky
one, the shift should be in the cautious direction.
Ermalinski's study (1972) involving two conflicting values
(heroism vs. personal survival) seemed to indicate that caution and selfinterest was the preferred value.

Although risk was connected to both

values, results indicated that the overall preference was for the relatively "cautious" risk. Thus, explaining courage, either traditional or
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contemporary, within the context of "risk-as-value" would of necessity
have to account for the specific type of courageous action involved.

If

heroism-as-risk were the preferred value there should have been a greater
willingness to risk death as opposed to time, money or effort in Ermalinski's study.
The paper-and-pencil method employed by Ermalinski has definite limitations.

One might conjecture that within the context of an

actual group situation, where action is necessary, the value of heroism
and the risk therein might allow for an explanation of "risk-as-value".
Courageous behaviour such as risking one's life for another could be
found within the context of altruism.

The classic case of Kitty

Genovese, however, again illustrates that although risk may be a value,
this risk may be limited to monetary or otherwise relatively safe risks.
Resorting to the explanation of a group cautious value expressed within
that situation would necessitate a very loose definition of "group".
Moore's study (1972) of delinquent and non-delinquent boys and
the "dare phenomenon" appears to lend itself better to an interpretation
of "risk-as-value". The non-delinquent group most often accepted a dare
in order to prove that they were men.

Over half of the delinquent group

also indicated acceptance of a dare in order to prove they were men. A
large percentage, however, also accepted the dare both to experience the
thrill and excitement of the risky activity and to be accepted by the
gang.

Thus, the value placed on courage, and the risk involved therein,

does not appear to be a sufficient explanation.
Other studies indicate that stress and conformity may explain
risk-taking behaviour. Lieblich (1968), using electrical shock to
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create a stress situation, found that both relevant and irrelevant
stress situations resulted in greater risk-taking behaviours. The necessity to prove one's manhood, or one's courage, through acceptance of
personal physical risk would seem to create a relatively stressful situation.

Fulfilling the requirements of manhood through risky, courageous

behaviour could just as well be a function of stress.
Conformity may also explain courage in Moore's experiment.
Utech and Hoving (1969) found that "conformity to the advice of parents
is a decreasing function of age when parents and peers offer conflicting
advice" (p. 271). Thus, accepting the dare phenomenon and demonstrating
one's courage may be a function of conformity to peer-group norms. Likewise, courage, within the context of risk-taking behaviour, may be explained as being a function of conformity.
The risk inherent in contemporary conceptions of courage involves not only the physical risk of death or injury but also the psychological risk of rejection and uncertainty as to the success of one's
efforts.

Both risk-as-value hypotheses and conformity interpretations

of risk (Castore, Goodrich & Peterson, 1970; Clark & Crockett, 1971;
Roberts & Castore, 1972) only partially explain contemporary courage.
The basic values which middle-class college students espouse
were initially taught to them by their parents. One could assume that
parents, or members of the old culture, still have knowledge of these
values (e.g. , cooperation) and perhaps practice them at times. Given
that these same values are basic to members of the new culture, which
in turn provides the stimulus for contemporary courage and the risk of
change therein, one could seriously question the relevance of
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risk-as-value to real life situations. Only under the broad assumption
that parental groups primarily lean towards cautiousness and student
groups lean generally towards riskiness is Brown's hypothesis appropriate as an explanation of contemporary courage. Yet, risk-as-value cannot account for the return to traditional commitments made by many
students upon graduation.
Conformity, as an explanation of risk and contemporary courage,
also is far from adequate. Whereas it might account for college students'
participation in for example, anti-war demonstrations, it fails, as did
the risk-as-value hypothesis to account for the return of students to
old culture values upon completing their education. Roberts and Castore
(1972) exposed Ss to prerecorded tapes with various levels of risk and
caution.

The significant shift toward risk when the tape was oriented

towards risk and the shift towards caution with the cautious tape suggested a conformity effect. The significant change toward greater certainty in their decisions after listening to the tapes led the authors
to suggest that an internalized attitude change had occurred. One might
speculate, with respect to students' return to traditional roles upon
graduating, that exposure to the real world and its ethic of competition
may have produced another "internalized attitude change". If one were
to accept this as an explanation, then mere exposure to the various
groups with which we come into contact would result in a continual switching of internalized attitudes. This seems highly unlikely.
Castore, Goodrich and Peterson (1970) also interpreted the
risky shift as conformity "or an attitude change motivated by social
comparison processes"

(p. 322). They found that it was not Ss who
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initially perceived themselves as being either Risky or Cautious, but
Ss who perceived themselves as being the Same as their peers who switched their preferences. The authors argued that those who viewed themselves the Same as their peers may not have relied as heavily on internal
standards in making their judgments. Those whose self-perceptions were
nonveridical may not have been as committed to their positions as those
whose

self-perceptions were veridical.
Thus, it might be assumed that conformity explanations may be

adequate for those who view themselves as being similar to their college
peers.

Upon entrance into the world of work they may realize that they

are, in actuality, more cautious and traditional than they had thought
themselves to be. Those who are initially more militant, and committed
to the values of the new culture, and those who perceive themselves as
being traditional and committed to old culture values may be veridical
in their self-perceptions and hence remain with their respective commitments after college. The presence of risk-related considerations per se
do not determine a person's response. Rather, commitment to his position,
which is veridical, and reliance on internal as opposed to external standards determine a person's actions. Thus, a veridical self-perception
as risky and self-reliant may explain contemporary courage.
Clark and Crockett (1971) also provide support for the conformity or reference group interpretation of the risky shift. While
high risk-takers shifted towards the cautious norm, as did initially
low-risk-takers, upon hearing the cautious tape, they still managed
to remain on the risky side. The author suggested that high-risk
takers are less susceptible to group influence than low risk-takers.
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The hypothesized greater self-reliance and veridical selfperceptions of Ss as risk-takers in addition to their low susceptibility
to the pull of the group could explain contemporary courage.

The fact

that some small shift towards caution does occur might explain the
acceptance of some traditional roles upon leaving college.

These may be

the less visible adherents of the new culture. They might also be defined as those working towards change "within" the system, as opposed to
the activists operating outside the system proper (Katz, 1967).
The risk implicit in contemporary conceptions of courage also
involves the aspect of uncertainty.

The probability of short or even

long-range success of one's efforts is difficult to determine. Actions
consistent with values of the new culture (e.g., cooperation and peace)
of necessity, possess uncertain outcomes. Contemporary courage involves
not merely concrete objectives such as changing laws, but abstract goals
such as attitude change and a general re-structuring of the basic values
underlying our life-style. Adding to the uncertainty is the questionable
amount of time and effort which needs to be expended before and if ideals
are to be realized.
Marquis and Reitz (1969) describe "pure risk" as "the situation
in which the decision maker knows all possible outcomes and can assign
definite probabilities to each outcome" (p. 281). "Uncertainty" is described by the authors as "the situation in which the decision maker is
unable to assign definite values to outcomes and/or is unable to assign
definite probabilities to each outcome" (p. 281). Life situations, as
opposed to the gambling games most often employed in risk-taking experiments, are characterized by uncertainty.

The authors constructed problems
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involving pure risk, small uncertainty and large uncertainty.

The

hypothesis that individuals would risk more on the pure risk as opposed
to the uncertain items was confirmed.
The uncertainty involved in contemporary courage when viewed
in light of the above results may explain the relatively small number of
adherents to the ranks of the militants. Individuals may be quite hesitant to stake considerable involvement in activities or life-styles
which have dubious probabilities of success or effectiveness.

Further

results reported by Marquis and Reitz however, state that group involvement significantly increases willingness to take risks on problems involving uncertainty.

They speculate that "group discussion not only

magnifies expected value, but also achieves clarification (reduction of
uncertainty) with a consequent shift to a more risky choice" (p. 288).
Thus, the seeming greater involvement of college students with values
characteristic of the new culture and their active radicalism may in part
be a function of group involvement.

Leaving college may result in a dis-

persion of the group and the consequent shift to a less risky and more
traditional life-style.
Higbee and Streufert (1969) note a discrepancy between results
obtained in laboratory and real life situations. They report that experimental studies indicate a greater willingness to take risks for Ss
who feel that they have control over the outcome of their decisions.
Chance orientations, on the other hand, appear to result in a lower willingness to take risks. Higbee and Streufert claim that many real life
situations produce opposite results. Individuals in control are less
risky than individuals not in control of their environment.

They state:
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The conditions producing risky decision making in the kinds
of real-world situations described above [politics, war,
competitive sports] may differ from the psychological laboratory studies in several ways: 1) most such real-world
situations involve conflict - the people not in control
want to gain control; 2) potential loss and gain is likely
to be greater in the real world; 3) there is probably greater
personal involvement of the decision makers in the real world
(since careers, fortunes, and lives are often at stake); and
4) outcomes of decisions in the real world are more complex,
based on interacting multiple determinants rather than on a
single determinant (such as the roll of a die), (p. 105)
Higbee and Streufert employed the "tactical negotiations game" (p. 106)
in an effort to study risk-taking in a simulated real-life situation.
Results indicated that Ss with less control over their environment were
significantly riskier than Ss who were in control. The authors studied
economic decision-making in their experiment.
Malmuth and Fesbach (1972) investigated the risky shift in a
naturalistic setting. They questioned whether the risky shift could be
demonstrated in a realistic choice situation where the expected values
were not constant. The situation was designed so that choosing the risky
alternative was contrary to rational decision making.

They found that,

contrary to the Individual Condition, decisions of individuals were
"riskier from the first trial within the Group Condition" (p. 45). They
postulated that the lack of finality and the uncertainty of their individual decisions, coupled with the value of risk may have accounted for
the results.
Thus, the uncertainty or "chance" nature of contemporary courage, coupled with the likelihood of a group situation, at least on the
level of discussion, may lend itself to interpretation by risk-taking
theories. The generality of risk-taking across different situations,
however, must be taken into account. All of the studies cited involved
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economic risk-taking situations.

Contemporary conceptions of courage

involve non-economic and abstract conceptions of risk. Values, ideals,
attitudes and change are at stake as opposed to money which may be
hypothetical or if real, may not belong to the individual. A general
disposition towards risk which is valid in various situations is necessary if contemporary courage is to be adequately explained within the
framework of risk-taking theory.
Jackson, Hourany and Vidmar (1972) state that although risktaking is assumed to be a general psychological disposition, and hence
generalizable across situations and various types of risk, "attempts to
find convergent validity among various risk-taking measures have yielded
discouraging results" (p. 483). A number of hypotheses have been generated to explain this lack of generality.

The authors suggest that the

multi-dimensionality of risk-taking may account for the failure by
previous studies to establish positive correlations between various risktaking measures and objective measures of risk. Most risk-taking studies
have concentrated on a single dimension of risk, that of monetary risk
taking.

The authors hypothesized:

risk-taking may be conceptualized in terms of an hierachical model. In this model the dimension of risk-taking is
a higher order construct with four constituent facets.
These facets will be reflected in consistent and to a
certain extent independent behaviour across diverse methods
of measurement, (p. 487)
Thus, risk-taking may vary across four categories of situations:
monetary, physical, ethical and social. Four methods of measurement were
developed for each facet:

a Self-rating scale, situational dilemmas,

Vocational choice and a Personality Scale.

Correlational and factor

analytic data supported hypothesis cited above. Although four independent
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factors were obtained, they were able to isolate a generalized risktaking factor at the second order.
The above study has implications for future meaningful research
concerning courage. Results suggest that we might explain both traditional and contemporary courage within the framework of a general risktaking disposition.

Furthermore, the two types of courage isolated in

this paper, traditional and contemporary, appear to correspond with the
two facets of risk-taking entitled physical and social, respectively.
It might, therefore, be possible, by constructing a multi-trait, multimethod matrix similar to that suggested above, to verify assumptions as
to the self-image, behaviour, life-style and personality of individuals
who appear to demonstrate a specific form of courage.
The decision-making process and risk inherent in contemporary
courage was not adequately explained by risk-as-value or conformity
explanations of the risky-shift phenomenon.

A theoretical organization

of viable explanations of the risky-shift (Vinokur, 1971) concludes that
Brown's hypothesis which states that information about others' choices
should be sufficient to produce the risky shift, must be rejected.
Vinokur claims that the crucial factor responsible for either risky or
conservative shifts appears to involve "the flow of information relevant
to the issue being decided upon" (p. 236).
The overt decision change, according to cognitive explanations
of the risky shift, is a result of "a covert cognitive opinion change"
(Vinokur, p. 236). One's cognitive assessment of the situation being
evaluated determines the decision change, not the direct influence of
the situation per se.

Contemporary conceptions of courage, which stress
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cognitive assessment of the values of the old culture, appears to be
more amenable to an explanation which emphasizes decision making within
the context of content assessment.

The decision to risk adherence to

new culture values and life-styles does not appear to be a result of mere
exposure to college reference groups. The shift toward risk, or the
active commitment to change, might be a result of the information obtained and the arguments which are generated during discussion of values
and ideals with one's peers. Vinokur describes this cognitive hypothesis
as "Risk-as-Value Hypothesis: Information Relevant to the Task" (p. 236).
The "Rationality:

Expected Value and Subjective Expected

Utility Hypotheses" (p. 237) are also postulated by Vinokur as viable
explanations of the risky shift. Behavioural decision theory, the basis
of this cognitive hypothesis, concerns itself primarily with choices
among alternative outcomes. The values and utilities (personal subjective value) placed on outcomes of alternative actions, in addition to
the probabilities and subjective probabilities that outcomes will result
from a specific course of action, constitute the basic variables in this
theory. When subjective average gain is the criterion for choosing an
alternative course of action, the subjective probabilities (sp.) are
multiplied by the utilities (u.). The formula states:

SEU =

n
I

i=l

sp.u.
1 1

Contemporary conceptions of courage could be explained and
possibly subjected to experimental research within the context of the
Subjective Expected Utility Hypothesis. The above formula could be
roughly defined within the framework of choosing the life-style of the
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new culture as a preferred action. The basis for making this decision
would be the greater SEU of this choice. Although the utilities would
be perceived as being quite high, the short term subjective probabilities
may be quite low. This, however, might be offset by the long term subjective probabilities.

In other words, active adherence to new culture

values may not result in immediate positive outcomes. In fact, draft
evaders or active civil rights workers may face not only objective negative outcomes but also subjective negative outcomes. The latter may take
the form of exile, imprisonment or perhaps assassination.The long range
goals and belief that utilities (subjective values) will be realized
would increase the subjective probability that their actions will result
in the hoped for outcome.
Cognitive hypotheses assume that information exchange is the
crucial factor responsible for the risky shift.

Interactive hypotheses,

on the other hand, stress that interaction among group members is necessary for the shift towards risk to occur.

The "Extremity and Influence"

(p. 239) hypothesis states that the risky shift is a function of an
extreme position taken by a member of the group.

Concomitant with this

extreme position is greater confidence in his position.

The "Commitment-

to-Risk" (p. 240) hypothesis argues that the more confident members who
take an extreme position are also more committed to their position.

This

greater sense of commitment may simply be the result of the greater postdecisional dissonance following the decision, based on extensive prior
thought, to choose the risky alternative.

Conservative shifts are ex-

plained by the "influence through commitment hypothesis" (p. 240).
Members who prefer the more conservative alternative with a high
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probability of success influence those who prefer the risky choice but
are not as confident of their decisions.
Although seemingly incompatible, Vinokur claims that together
they may explain the risky shift in its full strength.

Taking the more

extreme position in the group may reflect the level and quality of the
information he holds. The more persuasive he feels his arguments are
in favour of a certain alternative, the more confident he will be in
holding his position. Actually engaging in group discussion should produce the strongest shifts. The less extreme members will have the opportunity to ask direct questions of the more extreme members and thus
clarify most points.
Whereas the specific nature of the interaction and information
exchange has been theoretically outlined, Vinokur remarks:
So far, nothing has been assumed about the nature of the
persuasive arguments. It remains to be seen whether the
persuasive arguments are those appealing to cultural values
of riskiness and caution in given situations, as Brown's
value hypothesis implies, or whether they are merely informational arguments bearing more specifically upon the desirabilities (utilities) of the various possible outcomes
in each situation, (p. 245)
Contemporary conceptions of courage, while at once explainable within
the framework of the postulated combination of cognitive and interactive
hypotheses, may serve to clarify the nature of the persuasive arguments
involved.

The poor fit of Brown's hypothesis and conformity explanations

of contemporary courage suggests that the confidence of activists in
their extreme positions and their commitment to new culture life-styles
may be based upon a striving to achieve valued goals rather than upon
a need to view themselves as similar to their peers.
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Affective
Commitment.

Central to contemporary conceptions of courage is

the affective aspect of personal involvement defined as "commitment".
Committing oneself to a definite course of action both defines contemporary courage within the adult realm and adds some degree of definitiveness to the decision. The aspect of commitment also serves to further
specify the precise nature of one's decision as relatively irreversible.
Concomitant with this notion of possible irreversibility is the possibility of post-decisional cognitive dissonance and the necessity of defending one's choice.
Most commitments within the context of contemporary courage,
one might assume, are irreversible only in a relative sense. For
example, active involvement and adherence to values of the new culture
may be only temporary or part-time in nature.

Involvement in these

activities may not be total in terms of time, effort or life-style.
Writing a letter to an M.P., donating spare time to peace movement or
civil rights efforts, while necessitating some commitment, is not final
and binding.

The need to defend publically such involvement may also be

minimal.
Other commitments inherent in contemporary courage may involve
a more absolute concept of irreversibility.

The decision not to obey

the draft, for example, could involve permanent exile, a period of
imprisonment and/or a heavy monetary fine. Such commitments to active
adherence to new culture values often necessitate the public statement
and quite probably, defense, of one's decision to the courts and/or
family members. One assumption might be that failure to realize one's
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goals, in view of having made such a binding commitment, may result in
dissonance and the need to justify one's actions.
Watts (1966) studied commitment under conditions of risk. He
suggested that a person's perceived estimate of the probability of
occurrence of an event was "an important variable mediating the cognitive
effects of the decision by determining whether the individual feels a
need to defend his prior act" (p. 507). He stated that cognitive dissonance reduction need not occur in the case where a person had made the
decision to prepare for an event which, although almost certain to occur,
fails to materialize.
the result.

Regret, anger or frustration would most likely be

If a person decides to prepare for an event which is uncer-

tain to occur, and indeed, does not occur, dissonance reduction should
follow. Watts stated that the latter is consistent with self-esteem
theory and notions of "inadequate justification".
Results (Watts, 1966) indicated that the Main Effect of Choice
was significant in the low probability condition.

Ss having high choice

indicated greater manifestations of dissonance reduction.

The second-

order interaction involving probability of outcome, choice and obtained
outcome was also significant and in the predicted direction.

In the dis-

sonant condition (event not occurring) Ss who chose to prepare for the
event, in spite of its low probability of occurrence, rated the preparation as less unpleasant than Ss who had no choice.
The risk and uncertainty implicit in contemporary conceptions
of courage would seem to justify attributing a relatively low probability
to the actual occurrence of the hoped for outcome. The choice to adhere
actively to "new" culture values and suffer the consequences of working
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towards change may be rated as high.

The poor fit of conformity and

risk-as-value hypotheses suggests that people are not pulled towards
active acceptance of new values and a new life-style involuntarily.

The

decision to accept the commitment to risk is a rational choice.
The slow process of cultural change suggests that new culture
adherents might accept either no change or even small setbacks in their
efforts for some time. They might remain fairly committed to their
cause, accepting the negative consequences of perhaps exile or imprisonment, for several years without cognitive dissonance. However, with the
passage of time, and with new wars starting in various corners of the
earth, these individuals may begin to perceive that the hoped for change
has not and possibly will never actually occur.

Still, they have suffer-

ed the rejection and the lowered self-esteem which might accompany im2
prisonment and exile with a very low probability of amnesty.
The new culture adherent may begin to feel that all of his
time, efforts and hopes have been for naught. He may, as Watts states
"perceive that he has made an irrational decision in a rational world...
feel foolish or dissonant, and attempt to defend his decision if it comes
to naught" (p. 515). The positive acclaim for new culture values, and
the expressed dislike by those exiled for war and the United States, may
merely be justifications which serve to reduce their state of dissonance.
Studies which examine the effect of commitment warnings on
predecision (Mann & Taylor, 1970) and postdecision (Mann, 1971) bolstering suggest that perhaps dissonance reduction is not an entirely adequate

President Gerald Ford has granted conditional amnesty to American war
deserters and draft resistors, September, 1974.
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explanation of commitment and contemporary courage. Theoretically,
the choice involved in contemporary conceptions of courage has been defined as largely a cognitive process. New culture activists may feel,
as Watts states: "that (they have) made a rational decision in an irrational world" (p. 515). Should this be the case, dissonance reduction
would not be the result.

Rather, simple regret, anger or frustration

would be experienced and expressed.
In an objective sense, the probability of the specific outcomes of peace and cooperation occurring may be quite low. The continuance of wars and the competitive ethic may indeed be interpreted as the
outcome not being realized.

Yet, subjective experience of the probabil-

ity that the goal one is striving toward will be realized may render the
individual's perceptions of his decision as rational.

Short-term nega-

tive events may not be interpreted by new culture activists as nonoccurrence of the outcome.
In relation to contemporary conceptions of courage, the concept
of "bolstering" may be employed to determine whether cognitive dissonance
reduction as opposed to a rational preference for new culture values is
operating. Mann (1971) defines postdecisional bolstering as "a 'spreading apart' in the attractiveness of the alternatives such that the chosen
alternative increases in value and the unchosen alternative decreases in
value relative to each other" (p. 76). If, under conditions of commitment, bolstering should occur, then one might assume that new culture
activists are merely justifying their actions by enhancing the attractiveness of their chosen alternative.
Mann and Taylor (1970) studied the effect of commitment, in
combination with choice difficulty, on predecisional processes. The
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authors postulated that commitment, which would render a choice as irreversible, may evoke greater sensitivity to the possibility of postdecisional regret. As a result, the alternatives may be more carefully
appraised in a rational and unbiased manner. No commitment under difficult choice situations should produce bolstering since the choice is
viewed as being reversible. When the choice is easy (that is, alternatives are disparate rather than close in value) then relatively little
bolstering should occur regardless of commitment conditions.
The above conditions of commitment/no commitment and easy/
difficult choice could readily be employed to describe contemporary
courage.

Using Mann and Taylor's definition of alternatives being either

close or disparate in value and hence defining the subsequent choice as
difficult or easy, one might postulate that choosing new as opposed to
old culture attitudes and life-style might be termed an "easy" choice
situation. The value differences are quite clear-cut (e.g., peace versus
war).

Commitment to new culture values should, therefore, produce little

bolstering.
The previous assumptions made as to relative and absolute
irreversibility of commitments within the new culture could provide the
basis for a "difficult choice" situation.

The decision to follow one

particular course of action as opposed to another In the pursuit of one's
goals is based on a common set of values, ideals and/or attitudes. The
consequences of commitment to one course of action, such as draft resistance, may be considerably more binding and irreversible than the consequences of another alternative, such as participating in a protest march.
Choosing the latter alternative might, in view of Mann's definition of
commitment as an irrversible choice, be regarded as a "no commitment
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condition".

In line with Mann and Taylor's predictions, one might ex-

pect systematic bolstering to occur in the difficult choice, no commitment condition.
Initial results (Mann & Taylor, 1970) indicated systematic bolstering regardless of commitment under difficult choice conditions.
Strengthening the commitment by requiring Ss to publically defend their
choice eliminated the bolstering in the difficult choice, commitment
condition as predicted by conflict theory.

Thus, the different levels

of commitment within the new culture life-style might be interpreted
within the framework of different pre-decisional processes. In line
with risk-taking theories, the more active militants may be the more
committed members of the new culture.

In line with predictions of con-

flict theory, these more committed activists may also be basing their
decisions on objective cognitive processes as opposed to subjective
evaluations.
Mann (1971) examined the effects of a commitment warning on
children's decisions. He stated that previous research has revealed
postdecisional bolstering in the commitment condition. His study failed
to confirm previous predictions. Mann's explanation for the lack of postdecisional bolstering centered upon the possible lack of postdecisional
dissonance in the commitment condition.

The possibility that the deci-

sion may have been binding and irrevocable may have elicited a careful,
well-thought out decision. He speculated that noncommitment Ss may have
made their decisions in haste and then felt some dissonance, hence motivating them to bolster their decisions. Mann states:
If, indeed, time taken to announce a choice in the commitment condition is devoted to cognitive work aimed at preventing postdecisional dissonance, then subjects with the
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longest decision times should be least likely to bolster
postdecisionally. (p. 77)
One should expect a negative correlation between time spent in scanning
the alternatives and the magnitude of postdecisional dissonance reduction.

The correlation between decision time and bolstering (r = - .28)

supported Mann's expectation (p. < .05). There was no association between time and bolstering in the noncommitment condition.
In relation to contemporary conceptions of courage, one might
speculate that commitment to a decision whose consequences are substantial, and perhaps irreversible, is indicative of a well thought out
decision.

The presence of pre and/or postdecisional bolstering, in com-

bination with the level of commitment to new culture values, may serve
to establish a qualitative distinction within the realm of contemporary
courage.

Those who are merely conforming to their present reference

group and are not fully committed may experience dissonance. Their resultant acclaim of new culture values and life-style may simply be a
need to justify their actions and thus reduce their dissonance.
Attitude.

Inherent in the distinction between the old and new

culture has been the notion of attitude change. More specifically, active
adherence to the values of the new culture and contemporary conceptions
of courage have been examined within the context of a general striving
for peace and an attitude of pacifism.

The specific nature of the atti-

tude change implicit in contemporary courage may, in part, be explained
within the framework of changing attitudes toward war.
Since proponents of the new culture have been described as
young, college age persons one might assume that changing attitudes towards pacifism are characteristic primarily of the younger generation.
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Public Opinion Polls provide somewhat contradictory evidence. Erskine
(1970) claims that opposition to the Vietnam war seems to be more widespread among the older generation. When asked, in October 1969, whether
the war was a "mistake", 63% of the respondents aged 50 years and older
replied in the affirmative.

A somewhat smaller percentage, 58%, of

those aged 21-29, also considered the war a mistake (p. 134). The author
calls this consideration of war as a mistake a "most inexplicable mystery" (Erskine, 1972, p. 616).
However, when the issue involves active protesting of the war
and public acknowledgement of one's position, the differing attitudes of
old as opposed to young become more apparent. A Harris survey obtained
in November, 1969, revealed that 52% of those under age 35 sympathized
with the goals of those actively demonstrating, marching or otherwise
protesting the Vietnam War.

In contrast, only 28% of those over age 50

sympathized with such active demonstrations of attitude towards the war
(Erskine, 1970, p. 134).
A further analysis of 185 poll items, dating from 1936 to late
1970, indicated that the shift towards pacifism is indeed more widespread
among the young.

Before 1965, the young exceeded the old in pacifism on

only 38% of the items. After 1968, the young exceeded the old in pacifism on 75% of the items. Thus, from being -2.3 average points less
pacifistic than the old before 1965, the young have moved to a position
where after 1968, they were +6.0 percentage points more pacifistic, on
the average, than those aged 50 and older (Erskine, 1972, p. 616).
Handberg (1972) compared the answers of college students to
items on the pacifism scale developed by Putney and Middleton, obtained
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in 1962 and 1972. Results are presented in Table 1.

The most extreme

pacifistic statements on the scale (questions 2 and 5) were accepted in
1962 by only 6 and 17% respectively.

In 1972, 31% as opposed to 6% ten

years earlier felt that the U.S. should begin gradual disarmament whether
other countries do or not, should disarmament negotiations fail. Also,
49% in 1972 as opposed to 17% ten years earlier, felt that it was contrary to their moral principles to participate in war and the killing of
others. A substantial percentage (67% in 1972 as opposed to 31% in 1962)
also felt that the real enemy was war and not Communism.

Support for

pacifism as a practical philosophy also increased.
The over 30 group were less pacifistic on all items than the
younger students with the exception of #6 which dealt with pacifism as a
practical philosophy.
to pacifism.

Social science and science majors were more prone

Business majors were the least pacifistic.

Handberg suggests that his results, obtained in a very conservative and militaristic section of the United States, are indicative
of more than a situational response to the Vietnam war.

Rather, a more

generalized response which might be called "the Vietnam analogy" (p. 615)
may have emerged.

He described the essence of this response as being

"an aversion to the use of force in international politics at any level,
for any reason other than perhaps self-defence" (p. 615).
Opinion Poll results provide general statistics which may aid
in further defining contemporary conceptions of courage.

The active ad-

herent to new culture values and attitudes is likely to be a member of
the young adult age group. The committed activist is also likely to be
a student of the social sciences and perhaps belong to the upper class.
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TABLE 1
Percentage Of Students Who Agree Or Mostly Agree
With Items In Pacifism Scale
Percentage of Students
Males
Items in Pacifism Scale
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
k

7.

The U.S. must be willing to run any risk of
war which may be necessary to prevent the
spread of Communism
If disarmament negotiations are not successful, the U.S. should
begin a gradual program
of unilateral disarmament, i.e., disarm whether other countries do
or not
Pacifist demonstrationspicketing missile bases,
peace walks, etc.- are
harmful to the best interests of the American
people.
The U.S. has no moral
right to carry its
struggle against Communism to the point of
risking the destruction
of the human race.
It is contrary to my
moral principles to participate in war and the
killing of other people.
The real enemy today is
no longer Communism
but rather war itself.
Pacifism is simply not a
practical philosophy in
the world today.
Number of cases

Total

Females

1962

1972

1962

1972

1962

1972

78

22

64

32

72

25

34

6

31

30

50

17

37

15

44

17

30

83

40

90

34

85

15

43

20

66

17

49

26

65

37

73

31

67

60

41

45

27

54

37

(697)

(109)

(502)

Reverse-scoring items on Pacifism Scale.
Data Table from Handberg, 1972, p. 612.

(41) (1199)

(150)
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A complete definition of contemporary courage, however, entails commitment to action as well as attitudes.

Opinion Poll results indicate that

the older generation, although perhaps as pacifistic in attitude, are
not nearly as willing to risk or condone active striving for change.
The suggestion that changing attitudes towards pacifism are
indicative of a general response to war may also lend some validity to a
definition of contemporary courage as the active expression of changing
attitudes and life-style.

Defining contemporary courage as a situation-

al response to, for example, the Vietnam war, might suggest that active
personal involvement would cease with the war.

The new culture frame-

work of contemporary courage, with its necessary component of active
commitment consistent with its values and attitudes, provides for an ongoing phenomenon which, at least theoretically, should know no temporal
boundaries.
Rosenbaum and Rosenbaum (1973) investigated attitude changes
of college students for three areas of international conflict. Attitude
measure results showed a statistically significant interaction between
Age and Issue (p. 168). The most dovish attitudes towards United States
involvement in Vietnam were held by those aged 23 and younger.

In con-

trast, students aged 24 and older were least dovish with regards to
United States involvement in Vietnam and more dovish than younger students with regards to the Arab-Israel and India-Pakistan conflicts.
Personal importance ratings showed statistically significant
Age and Issue main effects. The resolution of international conflicts
was of greater importance to younger students. The resolution of the
Vietnam conflict was also of greater significance than resolving other
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international conflicts. A significant Time main effect, however,
suggests an increase in apathy.

Regardless of sex, Ss in 1971 rated the

issues as being of less personal importance than did Ss in 1969. This
might, at first glance, suggest that contemporary courage is indeed situational. With the passing of time, and the official end of the Vietnam
war, the importance of war-related issues and the concomitant need felt
by young students to actively strive for peace, may disappear.
The significant interaction between Issue and Time lends some
support for a general, rather than situational, attitudinal component of
contemporary

courage. Although Vietnam was perceived as being less im-

portant in 1971, the India-Pakistan conflict increased significantly in
personal importance.

Thus, contemporary conceptions of courage might be

defined as the voluntary and active commitment to the general goal of
peace in the world.

The important factor appears to be the "reluctance

on the part of the American college students studied to have the United
States involved in any of these areas of international conflict, and
that this reluctance has become more pronounced with the passage of
time" (Rosenbaum & Rosenbaum, 1973).
Implicit in contemporary conceptions of courage is an active
commitment to an attitude of pacifism.

Studies which indicate that anti-

involvement is the rule do not necessarily fulfil the requirements of
this definition.

Jones (1970) grouped the 22 items on the Droba Attitude

Toward War Scale into four types.

Type 1 (4 items) were prowar or

militaristic in nature, measuring primarily attitudes towards human engagement in war.

Type II (5 items) were antiwar or pacifistic in nature

and measured attitudes toward human suffering and personal commitment in

Ill
characterized as Authoritarian.

New culture proponents question the

dictates of authority. They value openness and change.

Studies which

link degrees of Authoritarianism and Dogmatism to varying attitudes towards war may provide some evidence for personality correlates of contemporary courage.
Karabenick and Wilson (1969) state that Hawks (pro Vietnam
War-VW) as well as J)oves (anti Vietnam war-AVW) "have been characterized
as closed-minded and intolerant toward others not sharing their beliefs"
(p. 419). If this were the case, Doves as well as Hawks should not
differ in their scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (D-scale).

In addi-

tion, both Hawks and Doves should score higher on the D-scale than those
with more moderate beliefs towards the Vietnam war.

To test whether

Rokeach's scale was independent of belief systems, the authors constructed and validated a scale measuring Vietnam war attitudes (VW Scale).
This VW-scale was correlated with the D-scale.
Results indicate a significant positive correlation between VWand D-scales (p. 420). Bailes and Guller (1970), in a similar study,
also found a small but statistically significant correlation between D
and V scales.

Thus, open and closed mindedness, as measured by the D-

scale, is not unrelated to belief systems as signified by attitudes for
and against the Vietnam war.

Further results (Karabenick & Wilson, 1969;

Bailes & Guller, 1970) indicate that an inverse relationship exists between Dogmatism and opposition towards the Vietnam war. Doves were
significantly less dogmatic than both Moderates and Hawks.
Proponents of the new culture might, in view of the above
results, be described as possessing cognitive structures characterized
by open-mindedness.

These low-D persons tend to evaluate information on
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war.

Type III (7 items) were concerned with theory about war and peace.

Type IV was comprised of six miscellaneous items (p. 55-56).

Of signi-

ficance for contemporary courage are changing trends in answers to Type
I and Type II items from the 1950's to 1967.
For the militaristic items there was an increase of 14 percent
in the direction of pacifism, or nonacceptance of these items. For the
pacifistic items there was a decrease of 10 percent in the acceptance of
these items. Thus, the changing attitudes toward pacifism appear to
stem moreso from changing attitudes toward what Ss were against (i.e.,
militarism) than what Ss were for (i.e., pacifism).

The decision not to

fight cannot be interpreted as a decision to commit oneself and work for
peace.
Contemporary conceptions of courage, in view of Jones* results,
might be validly applicable to only a small minority of those who appear
to hold pacifistic attitudes.

Rather than simply condemning what exists

the ranks of the courageous would consist of those actively committed
towards positive change.

Jones speculated that this "minority may be in

its impact greater than its size.

In its extreme and activist methods it

may attract enough attention from the mass media and from uncommitted
youth liking excitement to magnify its force far above its numerical
strength" (p. 78).
Personality Correlates
The aspect of personal involvement, both cognitive and affective, has served to distinguish contemporary from traditional conceptions
of courage. Underlying the cognitive decision to accept risk and an
active commitment towards changing attitudes may be personality correlates of contemporary courage.

Old culture adherents have been
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the basis of its own merits, rather than its source.

Open-mindedness

also "implies the capacity to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty until
'sufficient' data are available to justify a conclusion about an issue
on more or less intellectual grounds" (Bailes & Guller, 1970).
The above authors also note that Authoritarianism as measured
by the F-scale correlates positively with Rokeach's D-scale.

Thus,

individuals scoring low on the D-scale might also score low on the Fscale and hence not be as responsive to authority.

Contemporary concep-

tions of courage, however, would require that results indicating low Fand D-scores would be applicable to Dovish actions as well as attitudes.
Izzett (1971) obtained both self-report and behavioural measures of attitudes towards and support for the Vietnam war.

He hypothe-

sized that students not attending class on the day of the October 15,
1969 Moratorium on the Vietnam war would have significantly lower Fscores than those who did attend class. Paper and pencil attitude measures should also reflect greater anti-VNW attitudes for those not attending class.

Results confirm the predictions. Although neither group of

students were proponents of the Vietnam war, those who did not attend
class on October 16, 1969, expressed significantly stronger disagreement
with two out of the three items reflecting pro-war sentiments. Izzett
concludes that a lower F-score most likely reflects greater opposition
towards the Vietnam war.
Granberg & Corrigan (1972) found that both A and D were inversely related to Dovish attitudes towards and fewer protest actions
against the VNW.

A significant positive correlation between A and D and

between attitudes and actions was obtained for their sample. Results
indicated that "higher authoritarianism was significantly related with
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more favourable evaluations of U.S. military actions in Vietnam and
fewer actions taken in protest against the war" (p. 472). The more
stable and pervasive correlations between A and VNW orientations led
them to conclude that the D-scale Is not as ideologically correlated
with VNW attitudes as the A-scale.
The above studies appear to provide some support for a description of the active new culture adherent as significantly more open-minded
and less readily accepting of the dictates of traditional authority than
the old culture proponent.

Yet, to link these characteristics more con-

clusively to contemporary conceptions of courage would require a more
detailed delineation of the type of protest action involved.

Those mere-

ly supporting a policy of anti-involvement by attending a moratorium would
have to be compared to those more active in working towards positive
change.

One might speculate that those committed towards a course of

positive change might represent the lower extreme with respect to A- and
D-scale scores.

The broad categorization of Doves, in view of contempor-

ary courage, could appropriately be subdivided into "committed" and
"uncommitted" Doves.
Granberg and May (1972) investigated the relationship of
Internal-External control and orientations towards the Vietnam war. They
state that previous research has shown non-violent civil rights workers
to be primarily internal whereas violent activists were significantly
external in beliefs.

They hypothesized that Dovish attitudes and actions

should be positively correlated with internal control. Results failed
to support the hypothesis.

They found "a slight but significant trend...

for externality to be positively related to more dovish attitudes (r = .12)
and to more protest actions (r = .13).

Partialling out attitudes, however,
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reduced the externality-protest action correlation to nonsignificance.
With protest actions considered as the dependent variable, they found
that only four of the eight independent variables ("attitudes toward the
war (.39), year in school (.21), authoritarianism (-.20) and religiosity
(-.16))" (p. 158) contributed significantly to variations in the dependent variable.

Of interest is that I-E control and dogmatism were not

significantly related to number of protest actions in their analysis.
Granberg and May conclude that throughout the course of the
war the beliefs of those involved in social action may have changed from
a position of internality to one of externality.

They speculate that

internals may be present in the early stages of a reform-oriented movement.

The assumption would be that one's efforts would result in posi-

tive reinforcement or achievement of desired goals. They speculate that
it might be more appropriate to view the I-E control dimension as the
dependent rather than an independent variable.
When viewed within the framework of contemporary conceptions
of courage, the above results are not at all surprising.

Regarding I-E

control as a dependent variable would mean that the nature of the situation would determine which belief system would be predominant.

Contemp-

orary courage has been defined as social action which is based on a
voluntary acceptance of risk.

Implicit in this risk is the notion of

chance and uncertainty of outcome.

On a superficial level, one might

interpret contemporary courage within the framework of Internal control.
This would be based on the assumption that new culture adherents believe
their goals or reinforcements to be directly related to their efforts.
The reinforcements involved in contemporary courage, however, are
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long-term in nature. Activists striving for positive social change may
experience many setbacks and possible negative reinforcements for their
efforts.

The individual striving for the goals of peace and cooperation

among peoples may indeed begin to perceive that his efforts and his reinforcements are unrelated.

Such a situation, wherein the realization

of one's goals are highly uncertain, may call for an External control
orientation.
Heilizer and Cutter (1971) Investigated personality correlates
of risk-taking.

Their data indicated that Ss with External beliefs

"take more extreme risks in chance-determined risk-taking than do low
I-E Ss - low "externals" or high "internals" (p. 276). In a study investigating risk-taking in Negro and White adults, Lefcourt (1965) notes
that Whites behave in an External manner when confronted with a chance
(gambling) situation. Whites were less cautious, wagered more money on
less probable bets and showed a preference for lower probability choices
than Negroes.
One might speculate that the old culture, which values competition and skill orientations as well as the ethic of hard work leading to
eventual success, would foster an I-control approach towards life. Striving after values of the new culture, however, no longer involves traditional reinforcements nor socially prescribed modes of obtaining goals.
Contemporary courage involves leaving the safety of the old culture and
risking failure by choosing short-term low probability outcomes. In the
absence of a highly organized and structured new culture, an External
control orientation, where luck or fate might determine success, seems
most logical.

The civil rights movement, which works within the system
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proper (Katz, 1967) in striving for concrete success in the form of
changing laws, and which has in fact seen some advancement in its goals,
might foster an I-control orientation.

ACTION CONSISTENT WITH BELIEFS
A comprehensive explanation of contemporary conceptions of
courage necessitates an analysis of its behavioural components. The
response or action implicit in contemporary courage has thus far been
referred to generally as a form of activism or striving towards goals
inherent in the new culture. More specifically, involvement in the peace
movement has provided the context within which the behavioural component
of contemporary courage has been defined.

Action, which completes the

definition of contemporary courage, may take many varied forms and could
be applicable to concerns other than peace in the world.

Active involve-

ment in community action programs, the civil rights movement or political interest groups might also be defined as action components of contemporary courage.
Miller (1970) defined "social activists" as those "spearheading movements to implement liberalized social changes" (p. 94). His
study focused on those arrested while actively protesting the Democratic
national convention in Chicago, in August 1968. Questionnaire results
(N = 107) indicated that activists possess social and political orientations characteristic of the new culture. Ninety-nine percent supported
the peace movement, 93 percent supported draft resistance, and 83 percent, the New Left.

In terms of nonviolence, 48 percent favoured it as

a universally applicable principle, 23 percent felt they would apply it
117
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situationally for themselves, while only 29 percent did not believe in
nonviolence.

The majority of arrested demonstrators (88 percent) were

charged with nonviolent acts.
There remains, however, a noticeable reluctance to explain
activism within the framework of adulthood.

Miller states that activism,

with its unique characteristic of "explicit congruity" (p. 100) can be
most readily explained by the newly emergent Youth Culture. Also, lack
of commitment to the adult roles of marriage and career allows for "fewer
responsibilities and less vulnerability to coercion than the adult, so
he is freer to take the risks of activism" (p. 101).
Defining contemporary courage (its behavioural component)
within the context of a Youth Culture would not only limit its scope,
but would also render it relatively riskless. Public expression of one's
beliefs would be safely condoned and tucked away within the boundaries
of a new and optional stage of psychosocial development.

This would

necessitate defining contemporary courage both temporally and spatially
within the ranks of high school graduates and college students between
the ages 18-30.

The broader conception of Slater's "new culture" as one

directly opposed to the old, rather than being merely an optional phase
in one's development, would seem to allow for a definition of contemporary courage within the adult realm as well.
Miller states that 75 percent of his sample were "youthful"
(i.e., between age 18-25).

By including high school graduates under age

18, full-time university students aged 26-30, and "a full-time worker
with youths (such as a social activist, lawyer, minister or college
teacher) between ages 26 and 30" (p. 100) he raised his "youthful"

119
sample to 82 percent.

Seven percent of his sample, however, also

listed "social activism" as their career choice. Thus, technically we
have activists who, through choice of a career, may be defined as adult
adherents of new culture belief systems.
Quinley (1970) indicated that active support of the Vietnam
war is also to be found among Protestant ministers. The "new breed"
(p. 43) clergymen, neo-orthodox and liberal in religious orientation,
stress that salvation is achieved by doing good for others. They appeared to possess "an activist social ethic" (p. 46) and were predominantly
"dovish" in their attitudes towards the Vietnam war. Ministers following fundamentalist and conservative schools of religious thought were
primarily "hawkish" in their attitudes towards the war.
Results for clergy participation in the Vietnam issue according to position on the war (Quinley, 1970) are presented in Table 2.
Consistent with their attitudes, "new breed" clergymen who favoured complete withdrawal from the war were more likely to express publically
their views both to the general population and to their parishoners.
Whereas almost all ministers had discussed the war with their parishoners
and had delivered a prayer before their congregation centering on the war,
"doves" were more likely to deliver a sermon on the topic and organize
study groups as follow-up.

Forty-six percent of the most "dovish" minis-

ters had attended a protest meeting as opposed to only 4 percent of the
most "hawkish" ministers. Of those advocating complete withdrawal, 19
percent had participated in an anti-war protest march and 7 percent had
risked arrest in anti-war civil disobedience.
Further data indicated that all ministers perceive the attitude
of their parishoners to be more "hawkish" than their own. Negative
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TABLE 2
Clergy Participation In The Vietnam Issue According
To Position On The War
Position on the Vietnam War

Clergy participation
Public Involvement
Made a public
statement
(N = 1,504)
Wrote a public
official
(N = 1,499)
Signed a petition
(N - 1,499)
Church Involvement
Discussed with
parishoners
(N = 1,511)
Delivered a
prayer before
congregation
(N = 1,504)
Delivered a
sermon
(N = 1,507)
Organized a
study group
(N = 1,505)
Protest Involvement
Attended a protest meeting
(N = 1,512)
Joined a peace
organization
(N = 1,502)
Participated
in an anti-war
protest march
(N = 1,511)
Participated in
anti-war civil
disoebedience
(N = 1,508)

Increase
Military
Efforts

Continue
Bombing

Stop
Bombing

Withdraw
to Enclaves

Complete
Withdrawal

Total
Sample

41%

47%

50%

68%

67%

53%

20

19

27

48

45

30

4

8

31

52

55

27

94

97

98

98

98

97

79

84

86

89

90

85

49

60

72

83

79

66

12

27

36

48

42

30

4

11

34

48

46

25

1

5

16

30

39

16

0

1

7

12

19

8

0

1

4

7

2

Data Table from Quinley, 1970, p. 48.

121
sanctions such as verbal reprisals, loss of parishoners' financial support, loss of members and attempts to have them removed from their positions corresponded directly with the "dovishness" of the minister. Of
note is the fact that the most "dovish" ministers who were also most
active publically (e.g., risking arrest) generated the most active support from some of their parishoners.
A sample of nonstudent demonstrators (N - 91) en route

from

Chicago to the anti-Vietnam war rally held in Washington, D.C., on October 21, 1967 were among those studied by Morse and Peele (1971).

Very

high educational levels (84 percent had attended college, graduate or
professional school) in combination with varied income levels (a third
were earning more than $10,000 and a third less than $5,000 in the previous year) suggests that nonstudent demonstators could be divided into
two groups. The authors speculate that the low income group may be comprised of those who have either dropped out or recently have graduated.
The higher income group may be older and better established.
Nonstudents were more radical, politically, than students.
Seventy-eight percent of nonstudent males as opposed to 70 percent of
student males stated that they would either leave the country or refuse
induction rather than serve if drafted.

Nonstudents had also partici-

pated in more civil rights and Vietnam activities.

Coding these activi-

ties for radicalism indicated that nonstudents again scored higher on
radicalism.

Results also indicate that nonstudents feel significantly

more alienated from the political system (p. < .001).

Although general-

ly possessing a moderate level of optimism for change, nonstudents felt
significantly less politically efficacious (p. < .025) than did student
demonstrators.
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The behavioural component of contemporary courage and the
social and/or political activism implicit therein, might allow for an
explanation within the context of national role conceptions. Katz (1967)
states that one's national roles are latent ones in times of peace. The
existence of war, whether or not directly declared by the nation, requires that "the individual must either assume his national roles or
leave the system.

And there are no places to go save prison or exile"

(p. 16). Contemporary conceptions of courage, however, rest on the assumption that, aside from prison or exile, an individual who does not
wish to assume the role of "soldier" does have an alternativer.
The new culture, by virtue of its separateness and opposition
to the established old culture, could be defined as an alternative,
though loosely organized, "system".

If the notion of voluntary and

active adherence to a new culture system is to carry any validity, then
some evidence for a changed conception of national role should exist.
This should, furthermore, correspond closely with the changing values,
attitudes and belief systems of the new culture.
Katz states that there has been a relative decline in symbolic
attachment to national roles.

Concomitant with this decline has been a

rise in normative and functional commitment to national roles. This
allows for greater freedom of action and could result in cooperative
rather than military solutions in situations where symbolic attachment
and the patriotism therein would call for war.

These new and more pre-

valent forms of national role involvement, however, are still explained
within and assume continued adherence to the old culture system.

Katz

merely describes a different attitude individuals may take towards serving in war.
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The activism inherent in contemporary conceptions of courage
could be defined as a functional involvement with a national role conception characteristic of the new culture.

The new culture system de-

mands an ideological commitment to its values (e.g., peace).

The func-

tional nature of this commitment translates these values, of necessity,
into specific programs of action.

Thus, when viewed in terms of a func-

tional commitment, contemporary conceptions of courage cannot be complete
without an action component.
Morse and Peele (1971) define "national role" as "an individual's conceptualization of his relationship to the political system"
(p. 115). They state that some individuals, and most likely the majority
of political activists, are almost continuously conscious of their national role. They involve themselves with political activities, remain
informed, and work towards changing policies with which they disagree.
In contrast, politically passive or apathetic individuals de-emphasize
the aforementioned traits. They stress "buying savings bonds, being law
abiding, and volunteering to fight in wars in which the nation is involved" (p. 116).
The above distinction which is made between politically active
and passive individuals might be viewed as corresponding with contemporary and traditional conceptions of courage.

Thus one might conceive of

the new culture activist (both political and social) as being more often
consciously aware of his national role.
Evidence that activists' conceptions of their national role is
changing and is no longer as tied to the old system is provided by Morse
and Peele.

Results are presented in Table 3.

Although protestors are

still functional members of the old system in view of their socio-economic
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TABLE 3
Perceived Necessity Scores Of Activists For Selected
Components Of National Role
Role Component

Mean

S.D.

be law abiding

2.9

1.9

always support current policies of government,
although may work to change them if disagree

0.6

1.3

support Supreme Court decisions

1.8

1.9

be patriotic

1.8

1.9

buy U.S. Savings Bonds

0.4

1.1

volunteer to fight in war like World War II

1.6

2.0

become angry when people criticize U.S.

0.3

1.0

be critical in approach to public issues

5.0

1.5

be informed about current events

5.0

1.4

work to change policies with which disagree

5.4

1.3

be involved in political activities

4.2

1.8

Conformity

Traditional Patriotism

Political Participation

Note.-Highest possible item score is 6. indicating that the given
trait was considered "absolutely necessary".
Other items on this scale were: volunteer to fight in a war like the
Korean War, support strikes by labor unions, and refuse to fight in wars
of any kind.
N ranges from 371 to 398.
Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 125.
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and educational background, their cognitive commitment to the old
system indicates otherwise. Table 3 indicates that conformist and
patriotic national role components are given low priority by these
activists. Political participation, however, is seen as being of primary importance. Their conception of the good citizen is one who is
critical, informed and involved in working for positive change.
The behavioural component of contemporary courage appears to
be closely linked with the activist's changed national role conception.
A comparison group of nonparticipating citizens indicated a greater tendency towards conformity and expression of loyalty in traditional symbolic ways.

They were more accepting of demand such as serving in the

armed forces, which government could make.

Stressed by activists was

the individual's right to refuse such demands.
TABLE 4
Protestors' Scores On Functional-Internal Scale Items
Item

Mean

S.D.

3.0

2.2

1.4

1.8

5.1
5.4

1.5
1.2

Concern for Government
The war is undermining many American's faith
in their government.
A great deal of conflict is being generated
within the U.S.
Concern for People
The resources used to fight the war are more
urgently needed at home.
American boys are being killed for nothing.

Note.-Highest possible item score is 6. Zero indicated "not important
reason" for opposition, 6 indicated "extremely important reason".
Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 123.
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Table 4 shows that activists' concerns are also more directed
towards general human interests. They view themselves as being "citizens
of the world" (p. 124) and are not as oriented towards a specific national system.
Morse and Peele also provide data which suggests that the refusal of activists to participate in war is predicated both on internationalistic and moral concerns. Answers to questions measuring an internationalistic versus a nationalistic orientation showed a definite skewing towards the internationalism pole. They found that "slightly more
than a quarter of the sample (N = 410) (was) at the 80 (percent) or above
mark" (p. 122). Opposition to the war because it "is offensive for
moral reasons" (p. 123) was rated highest over other functional national
or world concerns as shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Protestors' Scores On Opposition To War Scales
Scale

Functional-Internal
Functional-External
Functional-World
Moral

Mean

S.D.

57
41
84
92

18.5
24.8
19.2
14.7

Note.-Highest possible scale score is 100; N ranges from 391 to 399.
Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 123.
In view of the strong leaning towards a general and largely
moral concern for the peoples of the world expressed by activists, it
might be appropriate to define contemporary courage within an international as opposed to a national role context. The common and most salient feature would be the voluntary decision to accept the risk inherent
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in social and/or political activism in an effort to advance new culture
belief systems. Subsumed under such a definition would be the active,
yet nonviolent resistance or "satyagraha" preached by Ghandi (Feuerlicht,
1965) , decisions to resist the draft and accept penitentiary sentences
by Americans (e.g., Osborne, 1971), or the social activism of Canadian
Dr. Henry Morgentaler in his efforts to legalize abortion (Weekend Magazine, 1974).
Stage 6 of Kohlberg's moral development conceptualization
would appear relevant. This stage of moral development, found at the
postconventional, autonomous or principled level, concerns itself with
universal ethical orientations. Within this stage:
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with
self-chosen ethical principles, appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles
are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical
imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten
Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of
justice, of the reciprocity and equality of the human rights,
and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual
persons, (in Holme, p. 307)
New culture activists who strive towards change and oppose the authoritarian dictates of the old culture might be exemplars of Stage 6.

Tradi-

tional conceptions of courage might be explained within the conventional
level of Kohlberg's moral development schemata.

The "law and order"

orientation (in Holme, p. 307) of Stage 4 with its emphasis on fixed
rules and respect for authority appears to characterize nonactivist or
more conforming members of the old culture.
Studies which examine draft-resistance, and more specifically,
the variable of signing versus not signing an

antidraft pledge (their

criterion measure of actions consistent with attitudes) provide data
which appears to support the definition of contemporary courage developed

128
in the present paper. An antidraft petition called the "We-Won't-Go"
pledge was the criterion measure employed by Janis and Rausch (1970).
They found that only a small minority, 2 percent, of the students surveyed (N = 200) had already signed the pledge. Those who were considering taking such action comprised 25 percent of their sample. Names of
the signers and the text of the pledge was regularly published in the
local newspaper. Thus, signers were aware of the strong personal commitment they were accepting in addition to the serious personal consequences (i.e., 5 years in prison and a $10,000. fine) they were risking.
In spite of admitted feelings of "considerable conflict,
anxiety and uncertainty about their decision" (p. 53) 12 of the 62 Ss
in the study chose to act publically in a manner consistent with their
beliefs.

Furthermore, when questioned as to their willingness to partici-

pate in other protest actions the authors found a strong significant
positive linear relationship (p. < .01) between Ss stand on the antidraft pledge and their willingness to engage in other protest actions.
This suggests that activism and engagement in a life-style which demands
striving for positive change is not restricted to one specific and isolated event.
Pro and antidraft articles were also presented for Ss to read.
A significant main effect for type of article showed higher interests for
propledge articles for all Ss. A significant interaction effect between
type of article and signers versus nonsigners was also found.

Interest

ratings did not differ for the propledge articles. For the antipledge
articles, however, those opposed to signing the pledge expressed significantly less interest in reading the articles. These results are the
reverse of what would be predicted by the selective avoidance hypothesis.
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The minority who act in a manner consistent with their beliefs
appear more ready to expose themselves to information relevant not only
for but also against their position.

Among the explanations provided by

Janis and Rausch is the possibility that "some important predispositional
attribute-such as a personality or ideological variable that makes for
marked differences in open-mindedness- might be the underlying determinant both of attitudes toward the We-Won't-Go pledge and readiness to
expose oneself to the pro or anti communications" (p. 53).
Cowdry, Keniston and Cabin (1970) defined consistency in their
study as "taking public action on one's private antiwar attitudes by
signing the MSR (Military Service Resolution)" (p. 522). Their main comparison group was between groups with equally strong antiwar attitudes
who either did or did not sign the MSR.

They designated these groups as

"signers" and "antiwar nonsigners" respectively.
With regards to social change, signers indicated a stronger
personal commitment to social action which they hoped would improve American society. Antiwar nonsigners, moderates and pros showed only a moderate commitment to social change.

Signers were also more likely than

antiwar nonsigners to favour action outside the established social channels in order to effect change.

The authors also found signers to be

"the most active group in all spheres of political activity-not only in
protest activity...but also in constructivist and traditional activity"
(p. 539). With regards to draft induction, significantly more signers
planned to refuse induction.
In contrast to the sociopolitical activities of signers,
moderates and pros showed a significant preference for conformist activities such as being in good standing at Yale and dressing in the "Yale
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manner".

Future professional plans of signers also indicate less rigid

ties to the old culture and its institutions. A significantly greater
proportion planned to enter the teaching profession as opposed to the
legal, professional and political choices of antiwar nonsigners.
Keniston's 13 alienation scales were also administered to all
Ss in the above study.

Results indicated that with the exception of

cultural alienation, all the remaining scales failed to distinguish significantly between the groups.

Cowdry, Keniston and Cabin conclude:

Today's student activists are not alienated in a general
way from their fellows, from group involvement, and so on.
The high observed correlation between antiwar attitudes
and 'cultural alienation' points instead to a more focal
rejection of the existing institutions, policies and values of American society...activists are alientated from
present American culture, (p. 545)
The above findings, in conjunction with evidence suggesting
that not only students but adults are also actively involved in sociopolitical activities in an effort to change existing policies, adds some
validity to the existence of a new culture and the contemporary conception of courage explained therein.

CONCLUSION
An exploratory attempt has been made, in the present thesis,
to obtain a more precise and hopefully scientifically useful operational
definition of the concept "courage".

Such a task has been very descrip-

tively and perhaps aptly referred to as that of "opening a can of worms".
Initially, such a conglomeration of definitions was uncovered that courage
seemed, at least superficially, to have lost all meaningfulness and
definitiveness.
The primary contribution of this thesis has been to isolate the
existence of not one but two major and radically different conceptions of
courage.

These have been termed "Traditional" and "Contemporary" by this

author primarily for the purpose of clarity and distinction.

Employing

the term "traditional" for one conception of courage was not to connote
that it was perhaps outdated or obsolete in modern society.

Traditional

courage was, in fact, found to abound contemporaneously.
Historically and in present times, traditional courage remains
a symbol of physical strength and prowess, as well as moral fortitude and
perseverance.

The highly deterministic nature of traditional courage

suggested that conformity theories may serve as an appropriate explanatory
framework.

Very evident was the notion that one earned the title or label

of "courage" through performance of various and almost ritualistic socially prescribed deeds (e.g. valour in battle, honour in sports, perseverance
131
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in hardships).
The highly subjective nature of the many definitions uncovered
and their quasi-philosophical basis made analysis on a psychological
level (i.e., operational definition) rather difficult. Physical courage
it was concluded could most appropriately be examined within a behavioural
context as a socially prescribed response to a specified stimulus. The
physical courage attributed, for example, to saving a drowning child,
suggested also that Altruism may be a potential research framework for
traditional courage. Moral courage was found always to be more highly
valued than physical courage. This author concluded that moral courage
might be researched as an attitude (e.g. optimism in the face of tragedy,
perseverance and patience in the face of prejudice).
The conception of a new definition of courage seemed to evolve
with the emergence of the "new culture" (Slater, 1971), a genuine Peace
Movement (Kincaid and Kincaid, 1971) and the acknowledgement of Youth as
a separate stage of psychosocial development (Keniston, in Holme, 1971).
These factors were examined in this thesis primarily as stimuli serving
to precipitate the need for a new and changed conception of courage. The
basic tenets of contemporary courage were found to be in direct contrast
to traditional conceptions. Relative freedom of response and personal
involvement of the individual, both on a cognitive (risk-taking, rational
decision-making) and affective (commitment, changing attitudes) level,
replaced the deterministic, non-personally oriented emphasis of traditional courage. Primary emphasis in contemporary courage is no longer on
coping with stress in a socially-prescribed fashion in order to merit
being called "courageous" or "a man". Rather, action towards positive
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change based on a freely chosen cognitive commitment to risk becomes of
primary importance.
Contemporary courage has in this thesis been discussed within
the framework of a Peace Movement.

This, however, must be viewed merely

as a frame of reference for isolating possible viable definitional components and providing theoretical support for contemporary courage.
Studies of activists (e.g., Morse and Peele, 1971) suggested that their
concerns were not limited to one specific realm but were fairly widespread.

Any form of social and/or political activism which is directed

towards positive and constructive change as opposed to merely voicing
privately one's negative opinions (Jones, 1970) was defined in this thesis
as characteristic of contemporary courage. A definite commitment placed
the courageous action within the Adult realm of experience (in Holme,
1971).

Emphasis on moral concerns for humanity and an internationallstic

role conception (Morse and Peele, 1971) appeared to support the new culture allegiance of contemporary courage.
The present thesis and the definitional components of contemporary courage outlined therein remain purely theoretical in nature.
Further research is required both to empirically assess this author's
contentions and hopefully to substantiate and enlarge upon the basic
speculations proposed.

A new dimension could in the process be added

both to risk-taking theories and activism research.
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